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Abstract
The present dissertation explores the hypothesis that English is a language with 
time-shifting grammatical devices. According to this hypothesis, the linguistic 
objects of English grammar which serve as the inputs to semantic interpretation 
have time-sensitive extensions and some of these objects play their roles in the 
process of interpretation by shifting the times relative to which other objects are 
interpreted. In a nutshell, English has intensional devices that manipulate times. 
The view that English tenses and temporal adverbs like now and then have 
time-shifting meanings was endorsed by some of the founders of modern formal 
semantics during the seventies and early eighties. These theorists studied certain 
fragments of English and proposed formalizations for them using regimented 
languages equipped with temporal operators. Subsequent research shed doubt on 
the operator-based approach of the early formal semanticists. Their intensional 
accounts of English temporal discourse were abandoned in favor of referential, 
quantificational, and dynamic theories. As a result, the hypothesis that English is 
a time-shifting language (in the sense suggested above) is no longer viewed as a 
tenable option in mainstream formal semantics. This dissertation examines the 
main lines of argument that have motivated this theoretical move away from the 
project of intensional semantics. I argue that the prospects for developing a 
plausible intensional account of English temporal discourse are not as gloomy as 
it has been assumed in the literature.
I examine four influential lines of argument for the view that English lacks 
temporal operators. The advocates of this view have argued that operator-based 
formalizations of English sentences are inadequate for the purposes of natural 
language semantics because they (i) have expressive limitations that can only be 
overcome by positing more and more temporal indices in the intensional system, 
(ii) are ad hoc and inelegant, (iii) fail to explain the pronominal uses of tenses, 
and (iv) fail to account for the behavior of embedded tenses. Although it is true 
that the lines of argument (i)-(iv) reveal the explanatory problems of traditional 
operator-based theories, I suggest that a sophisticated intensional account of 
English tenses can overcome those problems. If this suggestion is on the right 
track, the case against the hypothesis that English is a time-shifting language is 
far less compelling than it appears at first glance.
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Introduction
This dissertation discusses the idea that the tenses of English can be viewed as 
time-shifting grammatical devices. There are different ways of fleshing out this 
basic idea. One way consists in using the operators of some system of temporal 
logic to analyze tenses. Arthur Prior adopted this approach. Although Prior was 
more a logician than a natural language theorist, he analyzed the logical role of 
the English tenses using the operators of classical temporal logic.1 Prior’s work 
influenced early theorizing on tenses in the field of formal semantics. Some of 
the founders of this field endorsed the view that tenses can be formalized with 
the aid of temporal operators.2 By the end of the eighties, however, this view had 
become marginal in mainstream formal semantics. It was clear by then that a 
classical Priorean theory of tense (and of temporal discourse in general) does not 
account for the truth-conditions of various types of sentences. A variable-based 
paradigm emerged, especially among theorists associated with the tradition of 
generative grammar.3 On the accounts proposed by these theorists, LF-structures 
5
1 For some considerations regarding Prior’s views on this matter, see my footnotes 4 and 6 
below. The main contributions of Prior to the development of temporal logic can be found in 
Prior 1957, 1967, 1968b, and 2003. Some of his early insights in this area were inspired by 
his research on ancient and medieval logic. Indeed, the earliest  system of temporal logic 
proposed by Prior appeared in a paper devoted to the Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus 
(Prior 1955). For discussion of the impact of ancient and medieval views on Prior’s thought 
and other issues related to the origins of modern temporal logic, see Prior 1967, Øhrstrøm & 
Hasle 1993, 1995, Braüner et al. 2000, Copeland 2008, and Uckelman 2012a-b.
2 Among these theorists were Montague (1970, esp. p. 125, 1973), Kamp (1971, pp. 230-232), 
Lewis (1980, sections 5 and 8), and Dowty (see Dowty 1982 and Dowty et al. 1981, chapter 5 
and section VIII of chapter 7). The view is also endorsed in Dummett 1973, pp. 382-400, and 
Salmon 1989. In “Demonstratives”, Kaplan toys with the idea that natural languages have 
temporal operators (see his 1977, sections VI. (i) and XVIII), but he appears to be officially 
agnostic about it (see pp. 502-504, esp. fn. 28). The assumption that tenses can be plausibly 
treated as operators is at the heart of Kaplan and Lewis’s operator argument for temporalism. 
For some critical discussion of this argument, see King 2003, Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009, 
chapter 3, and Glanzberg 2011.
3 Classical papers by these generative theorists include Enç 1986, 1987, Zagona 1990, Heim 
1994, von Stechow 1995, Stowell 1995, Abusch 1997, and Kratzer 1998. Ogihara (1996) 
symbolizes natural language sentences employing a quantificational formal language. But, as 
I understand Ogihara’s theory, his LFs lack time-denoting constituents (see esp. sections 2.2 
and 2.6 of Ogihara 1996 and the appendix to the book).
contain variable-like constituents which denote times. The behavior of tenses is 
explained in terms of anaphoric and binding principles that apply to such covert 
time-denoting constituents. In this dissertation I examine the critical literature 
that motivated this paradigm shift in formal semantics. In my opinion, a striking 
aspect of this literature is that the operator paradigm has often been discarded in 
the light of some piece (or pieces) of evidence without careful examination of 
the ways in which the operator-based theory that is the target of the criticism can 
be amended. I argue that it is possible to overcome some important explanatory 
problems of the classical Priorean theories of tense without postulating explicit 
temporal variables. More specifically, I argue that if we abandon some syntactic 
and semantic assumptions that the early advocates of temporal operators made, 
there is room for developing more sophisticated intensional theories that treat 
tenses as time-shifting elements and can account for the linguistic data that un-
dermined the traditional Priorean approach.
In order to spell out the syntactic and semantic assumptions in which I will be 
interested, let me briefly characterize Montague’s account of English tenses in 
Montague 1973 (see esp. pp. 252-253, 257-259). This sort of account is a typical 
target of the critical literature on operator-based theories that I mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. Like Prior, Montague analyzed the present perfect and the 
simple future of English using temporal operators. But, unlike Prior, Montague 
adopted a model-theoretic framework.4 The PTQ system of Montague translates 
sentences (1) and (2) into formulas (3) and (4), respectively.
(1) John has run
(2) Mary will talk
(3) H run (j)
(4) W talk (m)
6
4 Prior did not favor the model-theoretic approach to temporal-logic systems that Montague 
and other theorists adopted (see Prior 1958b, 1968b, paper XI, 1968a, and Prior & Fine 1977). 
Prior always preferred a proof-theoretic approach, even after the development of possible 
world semantics in the early sixties. He was willing to accept temporal instants as individual 
entities only if they could be constructed out of tensed facts (see Prior & Fine 1977, p. 37). 
For a nice discussion of Prior’s methodological commitments, see Cresswell 2016.
The interpretations of the operator H (informally read ‘it has been the case that’) 
and the operator W (informally read ‘it will be the case that’) are given by rules 
that determine the truth-values of formulas of the form Hφ and Wφ relative to a 
PTQ intensional model (let us call it ℜ) and elements i, j, and g that intuitively 
represent (respectively) a possible world, a moment of time, and an assignment 
of values to the variables of PTQ’s formal language.5 If ⟦ ⟧ℜ, i, j, g is the function 
that assigns extensions to the expressions of this formal language, the semantic 
rules that interpret H and W are as follows:
(H) ⟦Hφ⟧ℜ, i, j, g = 1 iff for some moment j’ such that j’ ≠ j and j’ ≤ j, 
⟦φ⟧ℜ, i, j’, g = 1
(W) ⟦Wφ⟧ℜ, i, j, g = 1 iff for some moment j’ such that j’ ≠ j and j ≤ j’, 
⟦φ⟧ℜ, i, j’, g = 1
The extension of a sentential expression of the language is a truth-value, which 
can be either 1 (truth) or 0 (falsity). The intension of an expression (with respect 
to a model and a variable assignment) is a function from world/moment pairs to 
extensions. According to the rules (H) and (W), the truth-values of the formulas 
Hφ and Wφ  are determined by the truth-value that the intension of the formula φ 
assigns to that formula with respect to some moment of time different from j but 
temporally related to j. In other words, H and W are intensional operators which 
shift the current moment of evaluation to another moment.
I could say more about the semantic framework of Montague’s PTQ system. 
But let me stop at this point.
Let us call SOAT (for standard operator-based account of tenses) the view 
that the tenses and time adverbs of English (and other natural languages) can be 
formally represented by means of sentential operators interpreted by rules like 
(H) and (W). More specifically, let us assume that according to SOAT the formal 
representations of English sentences are formulas of an intensional first-order 
language with temporal operators à la Montague. An advocate of SOAT may 
7
5 A model of PTQ is a quintuple 〈A, I, J, ≤, F〉, where A, I, and J are non-empty sets (thought 
of as a set of individuals, a set of worlds, and a set of times, respectively), ≤ is a linear order 
on J, and F is a function that assigns appropriate intensions to the constants of the formal 
language (see Montague 1973, pp. 257-260).
want to think of these formulas as specifications of the logical forms of English 
sentences.6
There is a significant body of linguistic data that speaks against SOAT. Below 
I briefly summarize the data by mentioning some examples of the different types 
of English sentences that have been shown to be problematic for SOAT. All the 
examples are borrowed from the literature.
(To use a more standard notation, I will call the past and future operators of 
SOAT P and F instead of H and W. Let me also call ＜ the relation of temporal 
precedence between moments)
‘now’/ ‘then’ sentences
[Kamp 1971, Vlach 1973, van Benthem 1977]
(5) One day, all persons now alive will be dead
(6) Jones was once going to cite everyone then driving too fast
Sentences (5) and (6) cannot be expressed in the sort of formal language that 
SOAT uses. (7) and (8) are two attempts to express the truth-condition of (5) 
with SOAT formulas. 
(I assume that the variable x ranges over persons)
8
6 Prior 1962 appears to be the earliest publication in which Prior endorsed this view that there 
are temporal operators in English at the level of logical form. His earlier publications on 
temporal logic (such as Prior 1955, 1957, and 1958a-c) are focused on the construction of 
various operator-based logical systems. Although it is true that in those works Prior sought to 
regiment some natural language statements –e.g. the premises and conclusion of the Master 
Argument–, in my  opinion he was not sufficiently  explicit about the nature of the relation 
between such statements and their tense-logical regimentations. Logical-form-specification is 
one possible relation, but there are weaker relations –e.g. truth-conditional equivalence– that 
arguably suffice for the theoretical purposes of those early  works. By contrast, Prior’s analysis 
of the tenses of English in Prior 1962 (pp. 6-9) can be reasonably read as one that posits 
temporal operators in the logical forms of tensed English sentences. Although the expression 
‘logical form’ is not employed in that paper, Prior draws a distinction between surface and 
logical structure very  much in the spirit of Russell’s distinction between surface structure and 
logical form. Moreover, he argues that his logical analysis of tense allows us to solve certain 
metaphysical puzzles about the nature of time and change (see also Prior 1958c and 1967, 
chapter I, §8). This argumentative strategy makes more sense if Prior is giving an account of 
logical forms and not merely a translation into a regimented tense-logical language.
(7) F ∀x (x is alive → x is dead) 
(8) ∀x (x is alive → F x is dead)
But (7) and (8) have the truth-conditions given in (9) and (10), whereas the 
truth-condition of (5) is (11) –u stands for the time of utterance of (5). 
(9) There is a time t such that u ＜ t and, for every person x, if x is 
alive at t, then x is dead at t.
(10) For every person x, if x is alive at u, then there is a time t such 
that u ＜ t d and x is dead at t.
(11) There is a time t such that u ＜ t and, for every person x, if x is 
alive at u, then x is dead at t.
(11) is not equivalent to (9)-(10).
Sentence (6) poses a similar expressibility problem.7
Pronominal uses of tenses 
[Partee 1973]
(12) I didn’t turn off the stove
(13) Sheila had a party last Friday and Sam got drunk
Partee considered a scenario in which a speaker utters (12) to communicate that 
she did not turn off the stove during a particular time interval –for example, dur-
ing the morning of the day of utterance. (14) and (15) fail to capture the intuitive 
content of (12) because they quantify unrestrictedly over moments.
(14) ¬ P  I turn off the stove 
9
7 I discuss sentence (6) in chapter 1.
(15) P ¬ I turn off the stove
(14) says that the speaker has never turned off the stove and (15) says that there 
is some past time at which the speaker did not turn it off. This is not what (12) 
intuitively says.
(13) is naturally interpreted as saying that Sam got drunk at the time of the 
party. There seems to be a relation of temporal anaphora between the times of 
the two events reported in (13). SOAT does not have a way of capturing this sort 
of anaphoric relation.8
Enç sentences 
[Enç 1986]
(16) All rich men were obnoxious children
Enç discussed sentences in which nouns receive temporal interpretations that are 
independent of the tenses. She considered a reading of (16) in which (16) is used 
to communicate that all present and past rich men were obnoxious children. 
SOAT formalizations like (17) and (18) fail to capture this reading.
(17) ∀x (x is a rich man → P x is an obnoxious child) 
(18) P ∀x (x is a rich man → x is an obnoxious child)
(17) talks only about present rich men. (18) says that there was a time t such that 
all men who were rich at t were obnoxious children at t.
Embedded tenses 
[Enç 1987, Kusumoto 2005]
(19) John heard that Mary was pregnant
(20) Hilary Clinton married a man who became president of the U. S.
10
8 Partee also discusses the bound uses of tenses. See Partee 1973, pp. 605-607.
(19) has a simultaneous reading in which Mary’s pregnancy and John’s hearing 
overlap. Note that the tense of the complement clause of (19) in a past tense. If 
the operator P is the formal correlate of the English past, (21) seems to be the 
natural way of representing (19) according to SOAT.
(The verb hear can be represented in SOAT as a 2-place operator Hear that 
makes a formula out of a singular term and another formula)
(21) P John Hear P Mary is pregnant
However, (21) does not express the simultaneous reading of (19). It expresses 
the shifted reading of (19) in which Mary’s pregnancy precedes John’s hearing.  
Sentence (20) has also a past tense in its embedded clause. If P is the formal 
correlate of (20)’s embedded past, one would expect that a SOAT formalization 
of (20) is a formula with a P-operator under the scope of another P-operator. 
This is what we see in (22).
(22) ∃x  P (Hilary Clinton marry x ∧ P x become president of the U. S.)
But (20) and (22) have different truth-conditions. (22) locates the marriage event 
after the becoming-president event. (20) can be true if the two events occurred in 
the opposite order. 
Although these examples reveal the empirical inadequacy of SOAT, we can find 
valuable suggestions as to how to amend SOAT in the writings of Prior and in 
the writings of several theorists who have been inspired by Prior’s work. In this 
‘Priorean literature’, some assumptions of SOAT have been abandoned. 
Let me mention three specific assumptions of SOAT that will be relevant for 
the purposes of this dissertation.
(I) Single-indexing: SOAT is a single-index theory. It assigns truth-values to 
sentential formulas with respect to one time and one world. 
In the seventies, Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973) proposed multiply indexed 
logical systems with ‘now’/‘then’ operators. With the aid of these operators, it is 
possible to express the truth-conditions of (5)-(6). To my knowledge, the most 
11
sophisticated operator-based theory of tense that incorporates the idea of double-
indexing is the account developed in Dowty 1982. Dowty defined past, present, 
and future operators that relate two temporal points: the time of utterance and a 
time playing a role analogous to Reichenbach’s (1947, §51) point of reference. 
By relying on operators of this kind, Dowty proposed specific formalizations for 
the constructions illustrated by the sentences (12), (13), and (19).
(II) Times as instants: PTQ is a moment-based system. Its formulas are not 
assessed with respect to intervals of time.
Some interval-based system have been proposed in the Priorean literature. One 
logical system that incorporates intervals is Prior’s metric tense-logic.9  On this 
system, the past and future operators are treated as dyadic operators with an ar-
gument place for an interval measure and an argument place for a sentential 
formula. These operators give rise to formulas of the form Pnφ and Fnφ, which 
may be read, respectively, as ‘it was the case n-much ago that φ’ and ‘it will be 
the case n-much hence that φ’.10 Cresswell (2013) shows that sentences like (5) 
and (6) can also be symbolized in a metric tense-logical language. There are 
other ways of introducing interval-sensitivity into a temporal logic framework. 
For example, Blackburn has proposed some extensions of Priorean temporal 
logic in which new sorts of atomic propositional symbols are introduced.11 
These symbols are true at specific time instants or time intervals. They are the 
temporal logic analogues of temporal variables, temporal indexicals, and calen-
dar terms.
(III) Sententiality: SOAT’s temporal operators are sentential. They operate on 
sentential formulas. 
One important claim that I want to defend in this dissertation is that assumption 
(III) is not essential to the project of intensional semantics. We can postulate 
time-shifting operators at the sub-sentential level. Such operators might act on 
12
9  Metric tense-logic is discussed in Prior 1957, chapter 2, pp. 11-15, 1967, chapter 6, and 
1968, paper IX.
10  The interval-measure term appearing in such formulas can be quantified. This operation 
produces formulas of the form QnPnφ and QnFnφ, where Q is a monadic quantifier.
11 See e.g. Blackburn 1993, 1994, and 2006.
predicates, or maybe on sub-predicative syntactic constituents. The possibility of 
treating tenses as non-sentential operators has been envisaged by a few authors. 
But it has not been properly explored.12
This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part discusses intensional 
approaches that abandon assumption (I) but preserve the other two assumptions 
mentioned above. The second part explores two intensional analyses of English 
tenses that dispense with assumptions (I)-(III). Each chapter challenges a line of 
argument against temporal operators. Chapters 1 and 2 consider sentences like 
(5) and (6). In chapter 1 I criticize van Benthem and Cresswell’s suggestion that 
the problem that these sentences pose for single-index approaches generalizes 
leading to a semantics of infinite temporal indices. In chapter 2 I criticize King’s 
suggestion that formalizations with multiply indexed operators are inelegant and 
ad hoc in comparison to formalizations with explicit quantification over times. 
Chapters 3 and 4 challenge the idea that intensional theories cannot account for 
sentences like (12)-(13) and (19)-(20). Different intensional tools for modeling 
tenses will be considered in this dissertation. I start with ‘now’/‘then’-operators 
in chapter 1. In chapter 2 I describe some types of operators that make classical 
multiple-index systems more flexible. In chapter 3 I propose a way of analyzing 
tenses and modals as sub-sentential operators. The most sophisticated proposal 
that I discuss is the account of embedded tenses proposed in chapter 4, which 
represent tenses as LF-constituents with a time-shifting semantics.
13
12 See e.g. Enç 1986, pp. 421-422, and Salmon (1989, fn 31). The question of whether there 
are sub-sentential intensional operators in natural language has been discussed in the 
philosophical literature on semantic relativism (see Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009, pp. 74-76, 
and Kölbel 2011, pp. 144-145).
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Part 1: Expressibility 
and Multiple Indexing
15
16
1. Multiple Temporal Indexing 
in Early Formal Semantics
The idea of double indexing is a familiar one in the philosophy of language and 
in formal semantics. Arguably, Kaplan was the author who contributed the most 
to its refinement and popularization. But by the time Kaplan was developing his 
theory of indexicals, double indexing had already been in the air for a few years 
and double-index logical systems were being studied by theorists such as Kamp 
(1967, 1971), Vlach (1973), Segerberg (1973), and Åqvist (1973). Interestingly, 
the motivations that these theorists had for adopting double indexing were subtly 
different from Kaplan’s. One important motivation concerned the possibility of 
expressing the truth-conditions of certain fragments of English using intensional 
operators. In this chapter I discuss a family of arguments that rely on considera-
tions about the expressibility of the truth-conditions of English sentences. I will 
call arguments of this family expressibility arguments. Kamp, Vlach, and Seger-
berg motivated their double-index systems by appeal to arguments of this sort.1 
Expressibility arguments, as I will characterize them, may be invoked for 
many different purposes. But I will focus my attention here on some influential 
expressibility arguments from the literature on multiple indexing. Sections 1.1 
and 1.2 provide a formal framework for my discussion. In section 1.3 I analyze 
the basic structure of expressibility arguments by considering Kamp and Vlach’s 
expressibility arguments for double indexing. In sections 1.4 and 1.5 I examine 
the expressibility arguments that van Benthem (1977) and Cresswell (1990) 
gave in order to show that the case for double temporal indexing generalizes and 
leads to the postulation of infinite temporal indices. I argue that van Benthem 
and Cresswell’s arguments are rather modest in terms of dialectical force. I also 
17
1 See Kamp 1971, pp. 230-232, Vlach 1973, pp. 2-5, 39-41, and Segerberg 1973, pp. 77-79. 
Åqvist’s motivation for adopting double indexing was to avoid theorem (9c) of his system Å, 
which he interpreted as precluding the possibility  of non-contingent conditionals (see Åqvist 
1973, pp. 29, 58-59). As it is well known, Kaplan (1977, section VII) argued for double 
indexing, and against the view that he called index-theory, by reflecting upon the modal and 
logical properties of sentences like I am here now. His argument did not rely on expressibility 
considerations. When Kaplan considered sentences which may give rise to an expressibility 
argument for double indexing (see Kaplan 1977, section V), he was presupposing the context/
circumstance distinction and was arguing for something different. Expressibility  arguments 
are also absent in Lewis’ (1980) defense of the context/index distinction.
briefly discuss an expressibility argument based on an example of Saarinen 
(1978) that is dialectically more relevant for my purposes in this dissertation.
1.1 Basic syntax and semantics of ℒ-languages
In this section I describe the basic syntax and semantics of a family of formal 
languages. I will call the languages of this family ℒ-languages. I will reconstruct 
the expressibility arguments discussed in this chapter as arguments that compare 
the expressive potential of different ℒ-languages that use temporal operators.
From a syntactic perspective, ℒ-languages are first-order languages equipped 
with standard quantifiers, standard connectives, and sentence-forming operators. 
I will assume that every ℒ-language has a vocabulary that contains infinitely 
many variables, one or more first-order predicates, one or more monadic opera-
tors, and the symbols ¬, ∧, ∨, →, (, ), ∃, and ∀. The vocabulary of the language 
may also include individual constants and dyadic operators which combine with 
a singular term and a sentential formula to produce another sentential formula.
Let l be an ℒ-language. Let V be the set of variables of l, P be the set of 
predicates of l, I be the (possibly empty) set of individual constants of l, M be 
the set of monadic operators of l, and D be the (possibly empty) set of dyadic 
operators of l. Let S be the set V ∪ I (the set of singular terms of l).
The following rules define the class of well-formed formulas (wffs) of l:
(R1) If Π is an n-place predicate (for some positive integer n), Π ∈ P, 
and α1 … αn are singular terms such that {α1, …, αn} ⊆ S, then 
⌜Πα1 … αn⌝ is a wff of l
(R2) If Ο ∈ M and φ is a wff of l, then ⌜Οφ⌝ is a wff of l
(R3) If Γ ∈ D, α ∈ S, and φ is a wff of l, then ⌜αΓφ⌝ is a wff of l
(R4) If φ, ψ are wffs of l and ν ∈ V, then ⌜¬φ⌝, ⌜(φ ∧ ψ)⌝, ⌜(φ ∨ ψ)⌝, 
⌜(φ → ψ)⌝ , ⌜∃νφ⌝, and ⌜∀νφ⌝ are wffs of l
(R5) Nothing else is a wff of l
18
Let us turn now to the semantics of ℒ-languages. 
Def. 1 Let us say that a quintuple 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 is an interpretation of l 
if the following conditions hold:
(C1) D, W, and T are non-empty sets
(C2) ＜	 is a strict linear order on T
(C3) F is a function with domain I ∪ (P ∪ D) such that 
for every γ ∈ I ∪ (P ∪ D),
• if γ ∈ I, then F (γ) ∈ D
• if γ is an n-place predicate and γ ∈ P, then F (γ) is a function 
from W × T to ℘(Dn)
• if γ ∈ D, then F (γ) is a function from W × T × D to ℘(W)
If we think of D, W, and T (respectively) as a set of individuals, a set of possible 
worlds, and a set of moments, we can think of F as a function whose job is to 
assign denotations to the individual constants, predicates, and dyadic operators 
of l. Intuitively, F interprets these symbols in such a way that each individual 
constant denotes an individual, each n-place predicate denotes a function from 
pairs of worlds and moments to sets of n-tuples of individuals, and each dyadic 
operator denotes a function from triples of worlds, moments, and individuals to 
sets of worlds. Since W and T will be thought of here as a set of worlds and a set 
of moments, respectively, I will often call the elements of W world indices and 
the elements of T temporal indices (or simply times).
Let ℑ = 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 be an interpretation of l. Let us call any function 
from V to D a variable assignment (with respect to ℑ). I will adopt a couple of 
notational conventions concerning variable assignments. First, if g is a variable 
assignment, d ∈ D, and ν ∈ V, g[ν/d] is the variable assignment which maps ν to 
d and is otherwise identical to g. Second, if g is a variable assignment, Fg is the 
19
unique function from S to D such that for any α ∈ S, Fg (α) = g (α) if α ∈ V, and 
Fg (α)  = F (α) if α ∈ I.2
I will assume that the monadic operators of an ℒ-language are interpreted by 
means of semantic clauses that appear in the recursive definition of the notion of 
truth-value assignment for that language. In order to illustrate how this sort of 
recursive definition looks like, let us suppose that the monadic operators of l are 
the Priorean operators P and F.
Let A be the set of all variable assignments (with respect to ℑ). Let Wff be the 
set of all wffs of l.
Def. 2 The truth-value assignment of l with respect to ℑ is the unique 
(four-place) function ⟦ ⟧g, w, t from Wff, A, W, and T to the set {1, 0} such 
that for any g ∈ A, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, n-place predicate Π ∈ P, dyadic operator 
Γ ∈ D, variable ν ∈ V, singular terms α, α1 … αn included in S, and wffs φ 
and ψ of l, 
(S1) ⟦Πα1 … αn⟧g, w, t = 1 iff 〈Fg (α1), … Fg (αn)〉 ∈ F (Π) (〈w, t〉)
(S2) ⟦αΓφ⟧g, w, t = 1 iff for any w’ ∈ W such that w’ ∈ F (Γ) (〈w, t, Fg (α)〉), 
⟦φ⟧g, w’, t = 1
(S3) ⟦Pφ⟧g, w, t = 1 iff for some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’ = 1
(S4) ⟦Fφ⟧g, w, t = 1 iff for some t’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’, ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’ = 1
(S5) ⟦¬φ⟧g, w, t = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t = 0
(S6) ⟦(φ ∧ ψ)⟧g, w, t = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t = 1 and ⟦ψ⟧g, w, t = 1
(S7) ⟦(φ ∨ ψ)⟧g, w, t = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t = 1 or ⟦ψ⟧g, w, t = 1
(S8) ⟦(φ → ψ)⟧g, w, t = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t = 0 or ⟦ψ⟧g, w, t = 1
(S9) ⟦∃νφ⟧g, w, t = 1 iff for some d ∈ D, ⟦φ⟧g[ν/d], w, t = 1
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2 In other words, Fg is the unique function that maps each variable of l  to the object  that that g 
assigns to that variable and maps each individual constant of l to the object that F assigns to 
that constant.
(S10) ⟦(∀νφ)⟧g, w, t = 1 iff for every d ∈ D, ⟦φ⟧g[ν/d], w, t = 1
As usual, 1 and 0 are the truth-values truth and falsity. Clauses (S1)-(S10) tell us 
how the truth-values of l’s wffs are determined relative to ℑ. (S3) and (S4) are 
the semantic clauses of P and F. According to these clauses, the operators P and 
F shift the temporal index t of ⟦ ⟧g, w, t to another temporal index that precedes or 
succeeds t in the linear order ＜. Later in this chapter we will be interested in the 
expressive power of ℒ-languages equipped with ‘now’/‘then’-operators. These 
operators are introduced in section 1.2.
The truth-predicate of l can be defined in the following manner:
Def. 3 If φ is a closed wff of l, ℑ = 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 is an interpretation of l, 
w ∈ W, and t ∈ T,
φ IS TRUE IN l AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for every variable assignment g, 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t = 1
This truth-predicate applies to closed wffs of l (wffs of l without free variables) 
with respect to triples of interpretations of l, world indices, and temporal indices. 
A few comments are in order regarding the basic semantics for ℒ-languages 
given in this section.
First, our semantics for ℒ-languages is moment-based (or point-based) rather 
than interval-based. The drawbacks of moment-based approaches to tense and 
aspect have been known since the early seventies (see Bennett & Partee 1972). 
During that decade several theorists developed intensional semantic frameworks 
that incorporated intervals.3 Nonetheless, interval-based systems are hardly ever 
mentioned in the literature on temporal expressive power. The contributions to 
this literature that I am going to discuss in this chapter and the next one rely on 
moment-based semantic frameworks. This is my main excuse for adopting the 
same kind of framework here, in spite of the fact that interval-based frameworks 
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3  See Kuhn 1976, Åqvist 1978, 1979, Guenthner 1978, Åqvist & Guenthner 1978, Åqvist, 
Guenthner & Rohrer 1978, Humberstone 1979, Dowty 1979, and chapters 2-6 of Cresswell 
1985. 
are better suited for the study of natural language.4 Intervals will play a central 
role in the accounts of tense that I will propose in Part 2.
Second, although I have stipulated that the relation ＜ is a strict linear order, 
this stipulation will not play a crucial role in my discussion.5  If our aim was to 
investigate the logical properties of ℒ-languages, it might have been desirable to 
impose less constraints on this relation. What matters for our purposes is that ＜ 
can be intuitively regarded as an earlier-later relation between the elements of T. 
I take it that this desideratum is satisfied if ＜ is a strict linear order. But some 
relation weaker than a linear order may also do the job.6 As long as ＜ imposes a 
structure on T that can be reasonably viewed as a temporal structure, we can be 
open-minded with respect to the properties of ＜.
Third, the treatment of dyadic operators encoded in condition (C3) and clause 
(S2) is based on Hintikka’s classical analysis of propositional attitude reports 
(see Hintikka 1969). I adopt a Hintikka-style approach because it fits nicely with 
a standard intensional semantics for temporal operators. I am not committed to 
the view that this kind of approach offers a fully adequate analysis of attitude 
attributions and speech reports. Theories that rely on unstructured contents have 
well-known problems. But we do not need to worry about those problems here. 
Dyadic operators will be used in this chapter to express the truth-conditions of 
some types of English sentences. Insofar as the truth-conditions of ℒ-language 
formulas give a reasonable approximation to the intuitive truth-conditions of the 
relevant English sentences, we are not compelled to look for a more sophisti-
cated analysis of attitude and speech reports.
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4 Another reason to adopt a moment-based framework is that  with it  we can provide simple 
semantic clauses for the logical connectives –such as clauses (S5)-(S8) above– without having 
to deal with the technical problems that arise when we try to interpret those connectives using 
a notion of truth at  an interval. For discussion of these problems, see Cresswell 1985, chapter 
3 and chapter 5, section 9, and Landman 1991, chapter 5.
5 A binary relation on a set is a strict linear order if it is transitive, irreflexive, and connected. 
The properties of transitivity and irreflexivity entail that strict linear orders are asymmetric. 
(For accessible definitions of the notions of strict order and linear order, see e.g. Partee, ter 
Meulen & Wall 1990, chapter 3.)
6 We could have assumed, for example, that ＜ must be transitive, irreflexive, and backwards 
linear. (For a definition of backwards linearity, see Øhrstrøm & Hasle 1995, chapter 2.8.) This 
characterization of ＜ makes forward branching permissible. Since branching time will not be 
discussed in this dissertation, there is no need to revise (C2). But it is worth mentioning that 
my general approach is compatible with a linear or a branching conception of time.
Fourth, note that ∃ and ∀ quantify unrestrictedly over the elements of the set 
D. There is no requirement that the quantified objects exist at the index points w 
and t that serve as the current points of evaluation. If we take these indices to be 
possible worlds and moments, clauses (S9) and (S10) amount to treating both 
quantifiers as untensed and possibilist quantifiers. This treatment of quantifiers 
is standard in the literature on multiple indexing that is the focus of this part of 
the dissertation.7
Later in this chapter we will look at various sentences of English and we will 
wonder whether their truth-conditions can be expressed with the aid of temporal 
operators of different kinds. In addressing this question, it will be convenient to 
have a specific ℒ-language whose non-logical symbols are formal counterparts 
of some of the words and phrases that appear in the English sentences at stake. 
Let me call this ℒ-language L. I will assume that P and F are the only monadic 
operators of L. (However, I will use the symbols H and G as shorthand for ¬P¬ 
and ¬F¬, respectively.) Let me call Lex (for L’s lexicon) the set of individual 
constants, predicates, and dyadic operators of L. Below I give an ad hoc list of 
the primitive symbols of L that are elements of Lex. This list is based on the 
English sentences that will be discussed in chapters 1 and 2. L has no individual 
constants, predicates or dyadic operators apart from those included in the list.
Individual constants: Jones, Mary
1-place predicates: alive, barbarian, become ruler of the world, born, 
child, dead, drive too fast, happy, idiot, king, man, 
miserable, rich, support the Vietnam War, be told
2-place predicates: cite
Dyadic operators: Admit, Believe
As you can see, the predicates of L are correlates of certain adjectives, common 
nouns, and verb phrases of English. These predicates lack extra argument places 
for times, worlds, situations, or events. The dyadic operators of L are correlates 
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7 For discussion of some formal alternatives to untensed/possibilist quantifiers and constant 
domains, see Garson 2001 and Braüner & Ghilardi 2007. Notice also that the denotations of 
individual constants are index-insensitive according to (C3). By  contrast, the denotations of 
predicates and dyadic operators are sensitive to the indices w and t.
of intensional verbs that take that-clauses as complements. The two individual 
constants of L are correlates of the proper names Jones and Mary. (I will assume 
that these names refer to a specific Jones and a specific Mary.)
Our general definition of an ℒ-language interpretation specifies the class of 
interpretations of L (L-interpretations for short). The truth-value assignment of 
L with respect to an L-interpretation is defined as above (see Def. 2).
Some L-interpretations assign to the symbols included in Lex denotations that 
are inconsistent with the conventional meanings of the English counterparts of 
those symbols. There are, for example, L-interpretations in which Jones denotes 
Mary, in which the denotation of famous assigns to a world/moment pair 〈w, t〉 a 
set of individuals that are not famous in w at t, and in which the denotation of 
Believe  assigns to a world/moment/individual triple 〈w, t, d〉 a set of worlds that 
are not d’s doxastic alternatives with respect to w and t. Since we want L to be a 
language for specifying truth-conditions, it will be convenient to characterize an 
L-interpretation that is properly constrained by English meanings.
Def. 4 I will say that an L-interpretation 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 is the intended 
interpretation of  L if (i) W is the set of all possible worlds, (ii) T is the 
set of all moments of time, (iii) ＜ is the relation of temporal precedence 
between moments, (iv) D is the set of all individuals that exist in some 
world at some moment, and (v) F is such that
F (Jones) = Jones
F (Mary) = Mary
F (alive) = f : W × T ⟶ ℘(D)
For every 〈w, t〉 ∈ W × T,
f (〈w, t〉) = {x ∈ D: x is alive in w at t}
F (barbarian) = g : W × T ⟶ ℘(D) 
For every 〈w, t〉 ∈ W × T, 
g (〈w, t〉) = {x ∈ D: x is a barbarian in w at t}
...
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F (cite) = h : W × T ⟶ ℘(D × D)
For every 〈w, t〉 ∈ W × T, 
h (〈w, t〉) = {〈x, y〉 ∈ D × D: x cites y in w at t}
F (Admit) = f ’ : W × T × D ⟶ ℘(W)
For every 〈w, t, d〉 ∈ W × T × D, 
f ’ (〈w, t, d〉) = {w’ ∈ W: w’ is a world compatible 
with what d admits in w at t}
F (Believe) = g’ : W × T × D ⟶ ℘(W)
For every 〈w, t, d〉 ∈ W × T × D, 
g’ (〈w, t, d〉) = {w’ ∈ W: w’ is a world compatible 
with what d believes in w at t}.
I will assume that there is a unique L-interpretation that satisfies this definition. 
Condition (v) of the definition does not give the value of F for every symbol of 
Lex. But the attentive reader will have no trouble filling in the blanks. 
Admittedly, the denotation-clauses of condition (v) are rather artificial for the 
case of those Lex symbols that are correlates of English words and phrases with 
eventive meanings. It is odd to say, for example, that an individual is born, or 
cites someone, at a particular moment. Events like being born or citing someone 
unfold over intervals of time. As I explained above, I will set this problem aside 
in Part 1. Intervals and events will take up our attention in Part 2.
In using Def. 4 to specify the intended interpretation of L, I am taking for 
granted that the denotation function of an L-interpretation can be consistent with 
English meanings and assign classical set-theoretic denotations to the symbols 
of Lex. This assumption may seem at odds with the fact that English is a vague 
language. If the English noun child has borderline cases, how can the predicate 
child have a denotation which determines the set of children with respect to 
every world/moment coordinate? Given that vagueness is not a central topic of 
this dissertation, I will set aside this problem too. For the purposes of this chap-
ter, we can think of the denotation function of the intended interpretation of L as 
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a function that assigns denotations to the symbols of Lex using precisifications 
of the English counterparts of those symbols.8
1.2 ℒ-languages with ‘now’/‘then’-operators
In the previous section I defined the truth-value assignment of an ℒ-language 
with operators P and F as a four-place function ⟦ ⟧g, w, t. A language of this kind 
is a single-index language. In our present semantic framework, this means that 
the truth-value assignment of the language has only one argument-place for a 
world index and one argument-place for a temporal index. In this section I intro-
duce the ‘now’/‘then’-operators that were studied by Kamp and Vlach in the late 
sixties and early seventies. I explain how these operators behave when they are 
used in the context of an ℒ-language equipped with the operators P and F. Since 
L is an ℒ-language of this kind, I will characterize the ‘now’/‘then’-operators of 
Kamp and Vlach by considering some extensions of L obtained by adding the 
relevant ‘now’/‘then’-operators to L’s vocabulary. The truth-value assignments 
of ℒ-languages equipped with ‘now’/‘then’-operators have two or more 
argument-places for temporal indices. In our semantic framework, this amounts 
to saying that they are languages with multiple temporal indexing.
In this section and subsequent ones, I will informally describe the semantic 
effects of some operators in the context of their respective formulas. I will say 
that those operators “shift”, “delete”, “store”, or “retrieve” a temporal index. 
One can fully appreciate what an operator does in a formula by writing down a 
step-by-step derivation of the truth-condition of that formula. In the appendix to 
this chapter, I provide derivations of this sort for some of the operator-based 
formulas that we will consider later. My informal remarks about the effects of 
specific operators may be better understood in the light of the derivations given 
in the appendix.
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8 A precisification can be defined as in Weatherson 2014, section 7.3. The denotation-clauses 
of condition (v) can be reformulated in a way in which they include explicit reference to 
precisifications. Given an arbitrary  precisification of the noun child, F (child) could be the 
function that assigns to every world/moment pair 〈w, t〉 the set of individuals which, under the 
chosen precisification, are children in w at t.
Kamp developed the first double-index semantics for an intensional language 
in a short paper written in the fall of 1967.9 One of the intensional operators that 
he characterized in that paper was the so-called ‘now’-operator N. To see how 
this operator works, let us consider the ℒ-language that is obtained when we add 
the ‘now’-operator N to the stock of primitive symbols of L. I will use subscripts 
to name the extensions of L in which we will be interested here. Each subscript 
corresponds to a temporal operator that is added to L. Thus, LN is the language 
that results from adding N to the list of monadic operators of L. The truth-value 
assignment of every ℒ-language has to be specified by means of an explicit 
definition analogous to Def. 2. Such a definition must provide a semantic clause 
for each logical symbol of the language. Instead of giving explicit definitions of 
the truth-value assignments of the different extensions of L that we will consider 
in this dissertation, I will just give the semantic clauses of the relevant 
operators.10 Notice that if two ℒ-languages have the same individual constants, 
predicates, and dyadic operators, it follows from Def. 1 that they have the same 
class of interpretations. The interpretations of L are also the interpretations of all 
the extensions of L that we will consider in Part 1.
The truth-value assignment of the ℒ-language LN is a function ⟦ ⟧g, w, t, t’ with 
two argument-places for temporal indices. I will refer to the first temporal-index 
argument of a truth-value assignment as the time of evaluation and to the (first) 
world-index argument of a truth-value assignment as the world of evaluation. 
The second temporal-index of the truth-value assignment of LN can be thought 
of as the time of utterance of a sentence. I will call it the time of utterance.
Here are the semantic clauses of the monadic operators of LN:
Let 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 be an L-interpretation. For any wff φ of LN, 
variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, and t’ ∈ T,
(S3’) ⟦Pφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff for some t’’ ∈ T such that t’’ ＜ t, ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
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9 The double-index semantic system outlined in that paper was elaborated on in Kamp 1971. 
A recent analysis of the influence of Kamp 1967 on Prior 1968a can be found in Blackburn & 
Jørgensen 2016. For some early  references to Kamp’s 1967 paper, see Prior 1968a, pp. 104, 
110-112, Montague 1968, p. 116, Lewis 1970, pp. 185-186, and Kaplan 1977, p. 510. 
10 See the appendix to this chapter for a definition of the truth-value assignment of a doubly 
indexed ℒ-language.
(S4’) ⟦Fφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff for some t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’, ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
(N) ⟦Nφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’, t’ = 1
The three operators of LN shift the time of evaluation of their embedded wffs, 
but only N does it by reference to the time of utterance. N’s semantic role is to 
“check” whether its embedded wff gets the truth-value 1 when it is evaluated at 
the time of utterance. Since LN does not have operators that can shift the time of 
utterance, when the truth-value of a wff of LN is computed, the time of utterance 
remains available in the “semantic memory” of LN and can be recovered by N 
even if N is occurs in a subformula that is embedded under other operators.
According to a standard convention for the interpretation of formal languages 
with ‘now’/‘then’-operators, the computation of the truth-condition of a given 
wff must always start at an index coordinate in which the same temporal index 
occupies all the argument-places for temporal indices. Only at a later stage of 
the computation this index can be shifted. We can define a truth-predicate for the 
language LN that is in line with this convention.11
Def. 5 If φ is a closed wff of LN, ℑ = 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 is an L-interpretation, 
w ∈ W, and t ∈ T,
φ IS TRUE IN LN AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for every variable assignment g, 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t = 1
You can think of the world index and temporal index of a triple 〈ℑ, w, t〉 as the 
world of utterance and moment of utterance of φ. According to Def. 5, in order 
to determine whether the truth-predicate of LN applies to a closed wff, one has to 
look first at an index coordinate where t (the moment of utterance) occupies the 
two argument-places for temporal indices. Other index coordinates may become 
relevant only when a subformula of the given wff is interpreted.
In his doctoral dissertation, Vlach (1973) developed a logical system in which 
sentential formulas were semantically assessed with respect to two moments, but 
each of the two moments was shiftable. His system employed standard Priorean 
28
11 See e.g. Kamp 1967, p. 4, 1971, pp. 238-239, and Vlach 1967, pp. 5, 39-41.
operators, an operator K which he called the index operator, and an operator R 
called the ‘then’-operator. Let me call LKR the ℒ-language obtained by adding 
Vlach’s operators K and R to the language L. Here are the semantic clauses of 
these two operators:
For any wff φ of LKR, variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, and t’ ∈ T,
(K) ⟦Kφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t = 1
(R) ⟦Rφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’, t’ = 1
The truth-value assignment of LKR is a function ⟦ ⟧g, w, t, t’  with argument-places 
for two temporal indices. The first temporal index is shifted by the operators P, 
F, and R of LKR. The second temporal index is shifted by the operator K. We can 
view K as an operator that copies the current time of evaluation and stores it in 
the second-temporal-index slot. At a later stage of a truth-value computation, the 
operator R may retrieve that time by turning it into the time of evaluation of its 
embedded formula.12 R may thus be viewed as a retrieving operator.
Note that there is no difference between the semantic clause of the operator R 
and the semantic clause of the ‘now’-operator N. As Vlach correctly observed 
(1973, pp. 39-40), however, in a language with the operators K and R there are 
formulas in which an occurrence of R cannot be read as expressing the meaning 
of the English word now. When R occurs under the scope of an occurrence of K 
and that occurrence of K is under the scope of another temporal operator, R may 
shift the time of evaluation of its embedded formula to a time different from the 
original time of evaluation of the larger formula in which K and R appear. In this 
sort of sentential environment, R cannot be seen as bringing back the moment of 
utterance of the larger formula. It simply retrieves a time introduced by another 
temporal operator. 
Of course, I could have avoided having two operators with the same semantic 
clause by using only the operator N and claiming that this operator can loose its 
indexical character in some ℒ-languages (e.g. in ℒ-languages that employ N and 
K). But I think it is better to stick to Vlach’s notation and call the operators of 
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12 For an illustration of this storing-retrieving process, see the derivation 2.) of the appendix.
his system K and R. This will facilitate my discussion of Vlach’s views in the 
following sections of this chapter.
It is possible to add to LKR two extra operators K’ and R’ that act upon a third 
temporal index. The truth-value assignment of the language LKRK’R’ is a function 
⟦ ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’ with three argument-places for temporal indices. While K’ stores a 
given time of evaluation in the slot of the third temporal index, R’ retrieves the 
time stored in that slot and makes that time the current time of evaluation. The 
temporal operators of LKRK’R’ have the following semantic clauses:
For any wff φ of LKRK’R’, variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, 
t’ ∈ T, and t’’ ∈ T,
(S3’’) ⟦Pφ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’  = 1 iff for some t’’’ ∈ T such that t’’’ ＜ t, 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’’, t’, t’’ = 1
(S4’’) ⟦Fφ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’ = 1 iff for some t’’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’’, 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’’, t’, t’’ = 1
(K) ⟦Kφ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t, t’’ = 1
(R) ⟦Rφ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’, t’, t’’ = 1
(K’) ⟦K’φ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’, t  = 1
(R’) ⟦R’φ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧ g, w, t’’, t’, t’’ = 1
The truth-predicates of LKR and LKRK’R’ can be defined using a definition along 
the lines of Def. 5.
Def. 6 If φ is a closed wff of LKR, ψ is a closed wff of LKRK’R’, 
ℑ = 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 is an L-interpretation, w ∈ W, and t ∈ T,
φ IS TRUE IN LKR AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for every variable assignment g, 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t = 1
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ψ IS TRUE IN LKRK’R’ AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for every variable assignment g, 
⟦ψ⟧g, w, t, t, t = 1
This definition is also in line with the standard convention about truth-condition 
computations that I mentioned above.
We could add to LKRK’R’ two extra K-like and R-like operators that act upon a 
fourth temporal index. In the appendix to his dissertation, Vlach showed that it 
is possible to obtain a hierarchy of K/R systems by systematically increasing the 
number of temporal indices and introducing suitable ‘then’-operators and index 
operators. Each system of Vlach’s hierarchy has more expressive power than the 
systems located at lower levels. The truth-condition of every formula of each 
system is computed by looking at index coordinates in which the same moment 
occupies the different temporal slots that are available in the system at hand. But 
that moment can be shifted in different ways when a subformula of that formula 
is interpreted. The strongest system which Vlach outlined was a system that uses 
infinite K/R operators and whose formulas are assessed with respect to infinite 
sequences of times.13 14
1.3 The structure of expressibility arguments
At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned that the study of doubly indexed 
logical systems was partly motivated by considerations about the possibility of 
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13 Vlach  also described an alternative system with just one R operator and points of semantic 
assessment consisting of finite sequences of moments. In that system, the moments introduced 
by standard temporal operators are retrieved by  iterating R. Vlach claimed that this system 
has the same strength as the strongest system of his hierarchy –i.e. the one with infinite K/R 
operators–, but he did not prove this claim.
14  ‘now’/‘then’-operators raise interesting logical questions. In general, when you add an 
intensional operator to a language, you may increase its expressive power, but you may also 
loose some metalogical properties as a result. Kamp (1971) showed that the ‘now’-operator N 
preserves completeness in languages of propositional and first-order temporal logic. Vlach 
(1973) proposed an axiomatization for his K/R language and proved that  it is complete. For 
further references to the developments of that period concerning the logic of multiple-index 
operators, see Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema 2001, pp. 483-484. For more recent 
investigations of logical systems with multiple-index operators, see Marx and Venema 1997 
and Yanovich 2011, 2015. For a more general discussion of various systems of temporal logic, 
see Hodkinson and Reynolds 2007.
expressing the truth-conditions of certain kinds of English sentences with the aid 
of temporal operators. In this section I examine the structure of expressibility 
arguments by looking at Kamp and Vlach’s discussions of sentences (1) and (2). 
(1) A child was born who will become ruler of the world
(2) Jones was once going to cite everyone then driving too fast
Kamp (1971, pp. 231-232) argued that a proper symbolization of (1) could be 
given in a predicate language endowed with the ‘now’-operator N, but not in a 
standard language of temporal logic equipped only with the Priorean operators P 
and F. He observed that (1) was correctly symbolized by formula (3), but not by 
the formula obtained if one removes the operator N from (3).
(3) P ∃x (child x ∧ (born x ∧ N F become ruler of the world x))
Sentence (1) places the world-ruling event at a time that is posterior to the time 
of utterance of (1). If N is removed from (3), the world-ruling is represented as 
succeeding the child’s birth and no information about whether the world-ruling 
obtains after the time of utterance is provided. The operator N of (3) retrieves 
the original time of utterance of (3). Since this is the time which F shifts, (3) 
places the world-ruling at a time posterior to the time of utterance, which is the 
desired result.15
Vlach (1973, pp. 2-5) argued that the ‘now’-operator system of Kamp was not 
suitable for symbolizing (2). Using the operators K and R of his own system, 
Vlach symbolized (2) as (4). 
(4) P K F ∀x (R drive too fast x → cite Jones x)
32
15  See the steps 4-6 of derivation 1.) in the appendix. Kamp’s symbolization of (1) was 
slightly different from (3). I have chosen (3) because it is closer to (1) and has all the semantic 
features that are relevant for the discussion. I take it that the most natural reading of (1) is one 
in which the future world-ruler is characterized as being a child at the time of her birth. Since 
in (3) child occurs under the scope of P, this is the reading that (3) encodes. But it  is not 
generally  the case that nouns are temporally  interpreted in accordance with the tenses of their 
accompanying verbs (see Enç 1986).
Under the reading of (2) in which Vlach was interested, (2) is true just in case 
there is a past time t with respect to which the following is true: Jones cites at a 
time posterior to t those who drive too fast at t.16 The occurrence of the adverb 
then in (2) indicates that the individuals cited by Jones were fast drivers at a past 
time which is prior to Jones’ citing action. (4) captures this aspect of the truth-
condition of (2) by means of the operators K and R. The past time which the op-
erator P of (4) introduces is stored by K and later retrieved by R. As a result, the 
subformula drive too fast x is evaluated at the past time associated with the op-
erator P, while the subformula cite Jones x is evaluated at the time posterior to 
it introduced by the operator F.17
Formulas (3) and (4) are, respectively, wffs of the languages LN and LKR of 
section 1.2. The formal apparatus of sections 1.1 and 1.2 can be applied to com-
pute the truth-conditions of the formulas of L and its extensions. 
(I assume that truth-conditions are computed using the intended interpretation 
of L (see Def. 4). The possible worlds, moments, and individuals mentioned in 
our truth-conditions are taken from the intended interpretation. I will refer to the 
moments of the intended interpretation as times.)
Our semantics for LN and LKR predicts that (5)-(6) are the truth-conditions of 
(3)-(4) with respect to a world of utterance w and a time of utterance t (for step-
by-step derivations of (5)-(6), see the appendix to this chapter).18
(5) There are times t’, t’’ such that t’ ＜ t ＜ t’’ and there is an individual d 
such that d is a child in w at t’, d is born in w at t’, and d becomes ruler of 
the world in w at t’’.
(6) There are times t’, t’’ such that t’ ＜ t, t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every individual d, 
if d drives too fast in w at t’, d is cited by Jones in w at t’’.
The formal systems of Kamp and Vlach yield truth-conditions along the lines of 
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16 Arguably, gradable adjectives like fast require a standard of comparison to be interpreted in 
context. It  seems plausible to think that an utterance of (3) can be assessed as saying 
something true or false only  if context provides a standard of velocity relative to which 
someone counts as driving too fast. Vlach ignored this context-sensitive aspect of (3). For a 
recent analysis of the semantics of gradable adjectives, see e.g. Kennedy 2007.
17 See the steps 2-7 of derivation 2.) in the appendix.
18 The if/then-clauses of our truth-conditions must be understood as material conditionals.
(5)-(6) for (3)-(4).19 For the purposes of this chapter, it will be useful to recon-
struct the arguments of Kamp and Vlach about sentences (1)-(2) as arguments 
that make claims about the expressive power of L, LN, and LKR. These languages 
can only manipulate times and worlds by means of their temporal operators. For 
this reason, they are apt for investigating what kinds of truth-conditions can be 
expressed solely by resort to intensional time-shifts.
We can reconstruct Kamp’s analysis of (1) as an argument that relies on three 
claims. The first claim is that (5) specifies the truth-condition of (1) –assuming 
that (1) is uttered in world w at time t. The second claim is that (5) cannot be ex-
pressed in L. That is to say, no wff of L has (5) as its truth-condition. The third 
claim is that (5) can be expressed in LN. This amounts to saying that there is 
some wff of L whose truth-condition is (5). From the three claims it follows that 
(1)’s truth-condition is expressible in LN but inexpressible in L. Vlach’s analysis 
of (2) can be reconstructed as an argument based on three analogous claims. Just 
substitute (2) for (1), (6) for (5), LN for L, and LKR for LN in my reconstruction 
of Kamp’s argument. The conclusion of the resulting argument is that (2)’s truth-
condition can be expressed in LKR but not in LN.
Let me characterize the two arguments presented in the previous paragraph in 
slightly more abstract terms. They attempt to establish that a natural language 
sentence (S) can be symbolized in a formal language l but cannot be symbolized 
in a different formal language l’. To show this, the arguments make use of a 
regimented truth-condition which is supposed to provide a reading of (S). The 
truth-condition in question is specified with respect to a world of utterance w 
and a time of utterance t. Let us call that truth-condition (R). (R) may be the 
only reading of (S), its most salient reading, or just one of its readings. Here is a 
schematic representation of the structure of the two arguments:
Premise 1 
Under one reading of (S), (S) is true when uttered in w at t iff (R)
Premise 2 
(R) is inexpressible in l
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19 See Kamp 1971, §§ 2, 4, especially pp. 257-259, and Vlach 1973, sections IA, IIA. Since 
Kamp and Vlach were not studying world-shifting operators, their wffs were not semantically 
evaluated relative to possible worlds.
Premise 3
(R) is expressible in l’
Conclusion
(S) has a reading that is expressible in l but inexpressible in l’
I shall call arguments of this form expressibility arguments. In order to construct 
an expressibility argument concerning two formal languages l and l’, one needs 
a natural language sentence and a truth-condition. The argument is successful 
only if its three premises are true. The first premise of the argument fails if the 
given truth-condition does not really specify a reading of the sentence. To justify 
the third premise of an expressibility argument, one has to show that there is a 
formula of the language l’ which has the truth-condition at stake. Typically, a 
standard derivation suffices to prove that this is so for a particular formula. By 
contrast, the second premise of the argument can be very difficult to prove. For 
the second premise requires that there is no formula of l that has the relevant 
truth-condition.
The argument of Kamp regarding (1), for example, turned out to be incorrect 
with respect to Premise 2. Kamp (1973, §5) proved that N is not redundant in 
languages of first-order temporal logic. But (3) is not the kind of formula that 
illustrates this result. Given that the interpretations of L have constant domains 
of individuals –as opposed to domains that vary with times and worlds– we can 
correctly symbolize (1) by giving the existential quantifier wide scope over P. 
(7) is a symbolization of this sort. 
(7) ∃x (P (child x ∧ born x) ∧ F ruler-of-the-world x)
The truth-condition of formula (7) is (5). But (7) is a wff of L. Therefore, L can 
express truth-condition (5).
Another kind of expressibility argument that has been influential involves a 
sentence like (8), which is assumed to have the reading given in (9).
(8) One day, everyone now miserable will be happy
(9) There is a time t’ such that t ＜ t’ and, for every individual d, if d is 
miserable in w at t, d is happy in w at t’.
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It seems plausible to think that (9) cannot be expressed in L. Consider formulas 
(10) and (11). 
(10) ∀x (miserable x → F happy x)
(11) F ∀x (miserable x → happy x) 
(10) does not express (9) because it does not require that all the persons that are 
miserable at the time of utterance are happy at the same future time, which is 
something that (9) requires. (11) talks about people who are miserable at some 
future time and not about people who are miserable at the time of utterance. 
This is just an informal argument which suggests that (9) cannot be expressed 
in L. In a recent paper, Yanovich (2015, section 5) proves that formulas like (12) 
are not expressible in standard modal languages without ‘now’/‘then’-operators. 
(12) F ∀x (N miserable x → happy x)
I will not review Yanovich’s proof here. But it is worth mentioning that his proof 
shows that (9) –which is the truth-condition of (12)– cannot be expressed in an 
ℒ-languages that has only standard Priorean operators. So, if we accept that (9) 
is the intuitive truth-condition of (8), we can conclude that there is a successful 
expressibility argument to the effect that (8)’s truth-condition can be expressed 
in LN but not in L.
We have not yet considered expressibility arguments involving formulas with 
dyadic operators. Consider (13)-(17).
(13) Mary once believed that Jones would be rich now
(14) There is a time t’ such that t’ ＜ t and, for every world w’ compatible 
with what Mary believes in w at t’, Jones is rich in w’ at t.
(15) P MaryBelieve N rich Jones
(16) P MaryBelieve rich Jones
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(17) There is a time t’ such that t’ ＜ t and, for every world w’ compatible 
with what Mary believes in w at t’, Jones is rich in w’ at t’.
(14) is the truth-condition of the LN formula (15). Arguably, this truth-condition
is not expressible in L. For the only reasonable candidate for expressing (14) in 
L is (16). But the truth-condition of (16) is (17), which is not equivalent to (14). 
Of course, this is also an informal argument. But it suggests that sentences with 
attitude verbs may produce sound expressibility arguments involving the formal 
languages L and LN.
What about Vlach’s claim that (2) is expressible in a language with K and R 
but not in a language that only has standard Priorean operators and the operator 
N? This claim seems correct. In a proper symbolization of (6), the operators P 
and F must appear before the quantifier ∀ and F must appear under the scope of 
P. If the formal language does not have a storing operator like K, there is no 
way to store the past time that P introduces before this time is shifted by the op-
erator F. As a result, the subformula drive too fast x cannot be evaluated at the 
past time associated with the operator P. If this is so, (6) cannot be expressed in 
a language like LN. Thus, if we accept that (6) is a reading of (2), this informal 
argument suggests that (2)’s truth-condition is expressible in LKR but not in LN .
I hope my discussion in this section has served to clarify how expressibility 
arguments work and what kind of considerations are relevant in order to assess 
them. In the next section I discuss van Benthem’s (1977) attempt to show that 
doubly indexed operator-based languages are insufficiently expressive.
1.4 van Benthem against Vlach
van Benthem’s 1977 review of the early development of temporal logic is often 
approvingly quoted by the critics of operator-based systems.20  In that review, 
van Benthem discussed the expressibility arguments of Kamp and Vlach that we 
examined in section 1.3. He observed that the debates among temporal logicians 
about ‘now’/‘then’-operators had led to the postulation of increasingly complex 
temporal logical systems. One central thesis of van Benthem’s review was that 
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20 See e.g. Cresswell 1990, chapter 2, King 2003, section 4, and Schaffer 2012, section 2.2. 
See also Ogihara 1996, p. 28 and Schlenker 2006, p. 514, fn. 11. 
this tendency makes temporal logic systems converge towards a logical system 
with explicit quantification over times. van Benthem argued for this thesis in a 
section of the review devoted to Vlach’s K/R system. The central argument of 
van Benthem against Vlach was that the case for double indexing generalizes. 
Just as there are natural language sentences that make the adoption of double in-
dexing necessary for a temporal logician, there are also sentences that force her 
to adopt triple temporal indexing. van Benthem suggested that this is just the 
beginning of a slippery slope that ultimately leads to the postulation of infinite 
temporal indices. In this section I argue that van Benthem’s argument against 
Vlach is not compelling.
van Benthem offers one example to show that there are sentences of English 
which force a temporal logician like Vlach to adopt triple indexing. According 
to van Benthem (1977, pp. 417-418), sentence (18) is not expressible in Vlach’s 
K/R system.
(18) There will always jokes be told that were told at one time in the past
Needless to say, (18) is an odd sentence. Its most salient reading seems to be 
(19). (As in section 1.3, w and t are the world of utterance and time of utterance 
of the formulas that we are considering.)
(19) For every time t’ such that t ＜ t’, there is a time t’’ such that t’’ ＜ t, and 
there is a joke d such that d is told in w at t’, and d is told in w at t’’.
Informally, (19) says that for any future time t’, there was a past time t’’ such 
that a joke that will be told at t’ was told at t’’. But (19) is not the reading of (18) 
in which van Benthem is interested. (19) is expressible in the systems of Kamp 
and Vlach. It is expressed, for example, by formula (20). For simplicity, I as-
sume that the bound variable of (20) ranges over jokes.
(20) G ∃x (be told x ∧ N P be told x)
van Benthem gives a formal specification of the (alleged) reading of (18) which 
he has in mind. It is the reading where ‘at one time in the past’ takes wide scope 
over ‘there will always jokes be told’. In formal terms:
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(21) There is a time t’ such that t’ ＜ t and such that for every time t’’ 
such that t ＜ t’’, there is a joke d such that d is told in w at t’ and d 
is told in w at t’’.
Roughly, (21) says that there was a past time t’ such that for any future time t’’, 
some joke that was told at t’ will be told at t’’. (21) entails (19), but (21) can be 
false in a scenario in which (19) is true. It is controversial whether (18) has the 
reading specified in (21). Most English speakers have to make an effort to read 
(18) as expressing (21). Some speakers report that they do not get such a read-
ing.
van Benthem does not offer a proof to the effect that (21) cannot be expressed 
in Vlach’s system. He considers and rejects a number of possible symbolizations 
of (21) in terms of the operators P, G, K, and R.   
It is not difficult to find ways of expressing (21) if we switch to a triple-index 
framework. In section 1.2, I described the formal language LKRK’R’, which is a 
triply indexed extension of L containing two types of K/R operators that act on 
the second and third temporal indices of the function ⟦ ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’. (22) is a wff of 
LKRK’R’ that expresses (21).21
(22) P K’ R G ∃x (be told x ∧ R’ be told x)
In order to obtain the truth-condition specified in (21), one has to make sure that 
one of the occurrences of the subformula be told x is evaluated at the past time 
associated with P. The other occurrence of be told x must be evaluated at the 
time associated with the operator G that is under the scope of P. Let me give an 
informal description of how (23) does this. A derivation of (22)’s truth-condition 
starts by looking at an index coordinate in which the time of utterance of (22) 
occupies the three temporal slots which are available in the semantic memory of 
LKRK’R’. The operator P of (22) shifts the time of evaluation of its embedded 
formula to a time prior to the time of utterance. K’ stores this past time in the 
slot of the third temporal index. Since the time of utterance of (22) is still stored 
in the second-temporal-index slot, the joint effect of the operators R and G is to 
introduce a time posterior to the original time of utterance, which becomes the 
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21 Although H and G are not in the official list of monadic operators of L, recall that we are 
treating H and G as abbreviations of ¬P¬ and ¬F¬.
time of evaluation of the first occurrence of the subformula be told x. Finally, 
the operator R’ recovers the past time stored in the third-temporal-index slot and 
evaluates the second occurrence of be told x at that time.
In brief, van Benthem’s argument involving (18) is an expressibility argument 
in the sense of section 1.3. The argument seeks to show that (18) has a reading 
that is expressible in a triply indexed language like LKRK’R’ but not in a doubly 
indexed language like LKR.
As I mentioned in section 1.2, Vlach had considered the possibility of con-
structing multiple-index logical systems with three or more temporal indices. 
However, van Benthem dismisses the strategy of dealing with (18) and similar 
counterexamples by positing more temporal indices and more operators.
In an appendix, Vlach mentions a safety  valve which blocks this counterexample and simi-
lar ones. It consists in adding operators N1, N2 … and corresponding K1, K2 … in any quan-
tity. This will take care of all cases of cross-reference, but [...] such a move degenerates into 
using a typographical variant of predicate logic (with subscripts instead of variables), 
merely without calling it predicate logic.22
(van Benthem 1977, p. 418)
Here van Benthem is talking about Vlach’s hierarchy of K/R systems. Contrary 
to what van Benthem suggests, the strongest system of Vlach’s hierarchy is not a 
notational variant of a predicate logic system with explicit quantification over 
times. In two recent papers, Yanovich (2011, 2015) has shown that modal logic 
first-order languages with infinite temporal indices and equipped with infinite 
‘now’/‘then’-operators have less expressive power than extensional first-order 
languages with full quantification over times. Yanovich shows that the wide-
spread belief to the contrary among philosophers and linguists is the result of a 
misinterpretation of some formal results presented in Cresswell 1990. The basic 
first-oder modal language with ‘now’/‘then’-operators that Cresswell character-
izes in that book has also an operator of universal modality which makes the 
language much more powerful than a modal first-oder language equipped ‘now’/
‘then’-operators but which lacks the universal modality operator. (For discussion 
of this point, see esp. Yanovich 2015, sections 1 and 7)
Let us return to van Benthem’s expressibility argument regarding (18).
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22 Cresswell (1990, p. 22) concurs with this remark.
As I explained before, van Benthem’s assumption that truth-condition (21) is 
a reading of (18) is controversial and van Benthem assumes without proof that 
(21) cannot be expressed in a language with operators K and R such as LKR. 
Even if we grant him these two assumptions, there are double-index extensions 
of L that can express (21). One such extension of L is the language LP+F+R, 
which employs the operators P+ and F+ that I will characterize in section 2.1. In 
this language it is possible to define a monster operator G+ that shifts the second 
temporal index. But instead of simply copying and pasting the first temporal in-
dex –as K does–, G+ shifts the second temporal index to a time posterior to it. 
With the aid of G+, (21) can be expressed as (23).
(23) P G+ ∃x (be told x ∧ R be told x)
By writing down a proper truth-condition derivation, one can show that (21) is 
the truth-condition of (23) –a step-by-step derivation of (21) from (23) is given 
in the appendix to this chapter. The fact that (21) can be expressed in LP+F+R is 
important. It shows that triple indexing is not necessary in order to express (21). 
Thus, van Benthem’s example (18) does not provide a motivation for adopting 
triple temporal indexing.
Incidentally, notice that an English sentence like (24) seems to come closer to 
expressing (21) than (18) does.
(24) There was a time in the past such that it will always be the case that some 
joke that was told then will be told again
(21) seems to be one possible reading of (24). But it is important to stress that if 
(18) and (24) have a reading that corresponds to (21), this is so because of the 
role that the expressions ‘at one time in the past’ and ‘there was a time in the 
past’ play in these sentences. It does not seem possible to express (21) in English 
without explicit quantification over times. However, a theorists who uses ‘now’/
‘then’-operators to analyze the behavior of tenses and temporal adverbs like now 
and then does not need to be committed to the view that explicit quantification 
over times in natural language must be semantically represented in terms of 
temporal operators. When the surface structure of a sentence involves explicit 
talk about times, such a theorist can –and maybe should– prefer a symbolization 
that employs singular terms that refer to times and quantifiers that quantify over 
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times. If this is so, an advocate of ‘now’/‘then’-operators may not need to worry 
about examples like (18) and (24). I will return to this point in the next section.
1.5 More counterexamples to double temporal indexing
Let us move now to Cresswell’s discussion of multiple temporal indexing in 
Cresswell 1990. Like van Benthem, Cresswell (1990, chapter 2) argues that the 
kind of considerations that motivate double temporal indexing ultimately lead to 
infinite temporal indexing. The key example that he uses to argue for this claim 
is sentence (25).
(25) There will be times such that all persons now alive will be happy at the 
first or miserable at the second.
The reading of (25) in which Cresswell is interested is (26).
(26) There are times t’, t’’ such that t ＜ t’, t ＜ t’’ and such that for 
any person d, if d is alive in w at t, then d is happy in w at t’ or 
d is miserable in w at t’’.
To express (26), the semantics of an operator-based language must keep track of 
three times: the time of utterance t and two (possibly different) future times. In a 
proper regimentation of (25), the operators that introduce the two future times 
should take wide scope over the universal quantifier and the disjunction should 
appear under the scope of the universal quantifier. Formulas (27)-(28) express 
truth-conditions different from (26) because they do not meet these conditions. I 
assume that x ranges over persons in (27)-(28).
(27) ∀x (alive x → (F happy x ∨ F miserable x))
(28) (F ∀x (N alive x →  happy x) ∨ F ∀x (N alive x →  miserable x))
One may try to put the two F operators before the universal quantifier and use 
the operator K to store the future time introduced by one of these operators. This 
strategy is illustrated in (29). 
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(29) F K F ∀x (alive x → (happy x ∨ R miserable x))
However, (29) evaluates the subformula alive x at the future time introduced by 
the second F operator. If we want to predict truth-condition (26), alive x should 
be evaluated at the original time of utterance. 
Using the triple-index language LKRK’R’ of section 1.2, we can give a correct 
symbolization of (25). 
(30) F K F ∀x (R’ alive x → (happy x ∨ R miserable x))
In (30), R’ retrieves the original time of utterance, which is stored in the slot of 
the third temporal index, and turns it into the time of evaluation of alive  x. But, 
as Cresswell notes, the problem posed by (25) generalizes. For the disjunction in 
(25) can be indefinitely extended and each extended version of (25) introduces a 
new time in the truth-condition of the resulting sentence. Consider (31).
(31) There will be times such that all persons now alive will be happy at the 
first, or miserable at the second, or dead at the third.
Sentence (31) poses a problem for LKRK’R’ analogous to the problem that (25) 
poses for the LKR. Since we can generate more complex variants of (25) without 
limit, Cresswell concludes that only an operator-based system with infinite times 
in the semantics can symbolize all the variants of (25).
(25) and its variants may be problematic for a theorist who is interested in the 
project of capturing the expressive power of a natural language with the aid of 
‘now’/‘then’-operators. The expressive power of natural language is the topic of 
Cresswell’s book. Cresswell is right in pointing out that if we want to express 
the truth-conditions of (25) and its variants without using explicit quantification 
over times and by employing only standard Priorean operators and ‘now’/‘then’-
operators, then we have to posit infinite temporal indices in the semantics. But 
the first logicians who studied ‘now’/‘then’-operators were not pursuing this 
project. Prior was interested in the project of expressing overt talk about times in 
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temporal logic systems. But he invented hybrid logic for that purpose.23  The 
‘now’/‘then’-operator languages of Kamp and Vlach were not designed to for-
malize overt talk about times in English. Kamp and Vlach introduced their 
‘now’/‘then’-operators to study some fragments of English involving tenses and 
temporal adverbs like now and then. But they did not hold that every kind of 
temporal expression that occurs in a sentence must be accounted for in terms of 
intensional operators. Their views about the formal representation of tenses and 
temporal adverbs did not entail that every piece of temporal discourse should be 
regimented using only temporal operators. 
At the beginning of the appendix to Vlach 1973, Vlach said quite clearly that 
sentences like (25) and (31) were not a target of his K/R system.
There are other ways of doing the sort of thing that the system of this paper is supposed to 
do and many  systems that are stronger than the present one. The present system was cho-
sen for its relative simplicity, and because it seems sufficient to handle most actual English 
examples that would naturally  be expressed without the use of expressions that refer ex-
plicitly to times, like ‘the first moment’.
(Vlach 1973, p. 418)
Here Vlach seems to be excluding from the range of application of his system 
sentences like (25) and (31). He did not think that such sentences were problem-
atic for his double-index theory. Although he described a hierarchy of multiply 
indexed systems that were stronger than the original double-index K/R-system, 
he did not attempt to motivate any of those systems on the basis of observations 
about natural language. He thought that the doubly indexed K/R-system sufficed 
for symbolizing the fragment of English for which that system was designed.24
Kamp made a similar qualification in his 1971 paper on the ‘now’-operator. In 
a footnote, he rejected the possibility of symbolizing sentences like A child was 
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23 For some discussion of Prior’s views on this matter, see Blackburn 2006 and Blackburn & 
Jørgensen 2016.
24 It is worth mentioning that Vlach was not solely  interested in sentences involving the word 
then. In a section of his dissertation devoted to highlighting further advantages of the K/R-
system over the N-system, he suggested that the operators K and R could be used to 
symbolize English linear narratives exhibiting intersentential anaphora (Vlach 1973, chapter I, 
section 3). The study of similar linear narratives would later motivate the development of 
dynamic accounts of temporal discourse (see Hinrichs 1981, 1986, Kamp 1981, Kamp & 
Rohrer 1983, and Partee 1984).
born who will become ruler of the world using explicit temporal quantifiers. He 
wrote: “... one can object to symbolizations involving quantification over such 
abstract objects as moments, if these objects are not explicitly mentioned in the 
sentences that are to be symbolized” (Kamp 1971, p. 231, fn. 1). The if-clause of 
this passage suggests that he would not have objected to a symbolization of (25) 
involving explicit quantification over times.
In short, a doubly indexed treatment of tenses and indexical time adverbs is 
perfectly compatible with the view that English sentences which exhibit overt 
quantification over times and overt reference to times at the surface level must 
have formal representations involving explicit temporal quantification and ex-
plicit temporal reference. Since (25) and its variants are sentences of this sort, 
these sentences do not show that infinite temporal indexing is mandatory for a 
double-index theorist who accepts this view. 
Let us leave aside any potential counterexample to double temporal indexing 
which relies on expressions that quantify overtly over times at the level of sur-
face syntax. Are there English sentences which are inexpressible in a doubly in-
dexed language and do not involve overt talk about times?
Relevant examples are scarce in the literature on multiple-indexing. Saarinen 
(1978, part I) considers a number of interesting examples that are relevant to our 
question. (32) is an adaptation of one of his examples.
(32) Every man who ever supported the Vietnam War will have to admit that 
now he believes that he was an idiot then.
If we want to symbolize (32) with ‘now’/‘then’-operators, the predicate idiot 
must be evaluated at the past time at which the Vietnam War was supported and 
the dyadic operator Believe must appear under the scope of some operator that 
retrieves the original time of utterance. The semantics of the formal language 
has to store these two times and keep them in the semantic memory until the last 
stages of the computation. But, on the other hand, an F operator must appear in 
front of the dyadic operator Admit. If we are using a double-index framework, it 
follows that one of the two times stored in the semantic memory will have to be 
deleted by the operator F.
To illustrate the point with a concrete attempt of formalization, look at (33). 
(For the sake of simplicity, (33) does not represent the semantic contribution of 
have to in (32).)
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(33) ∀x (man x → (H ... support the Vietnam War x → ... F xAdmit ... 
xBelieve idiot x))
Either the time of utterance or the past time associated with H will be deleted by 
the operator F. Putting double-index operators in any of the positions marked by 
the ellipses will not help us to solve this problem. Thus, (32) seems to be a sen-
tence that is inexpressible in a double-index language and does not have the 
problematic features of the examples of van Benthem and Cresswell. 
However, it is not obvious that one can generate variants of (32) that make 
infinite temporal indexing mandatory for someone who wants to represent the 
English tenses and the adverbs now and then in terms of intensional operators. 
The obvious way of generating a relevant variant of (32) is to put one extra atti-
tude verb in (32). Consider (34).
(34) Every man who ever supported the Vietnam War will have to admit that 
now he believes that he will know that he was an idiot then.
Regardless of exactly which reading you get in reading this sentence, it is clear 
that (34) does not require keeping track of the two future times associated with 
will have to admit and will know. The semantics of a triple-index language such 
as LKRK’R’ can delete one of these two times once the future operators that intro-
duce those times have done their jobs. Thus, (34) is not a kind of example that 
makes quadruple indexing mandatory for an intensional account of tenses and 
time adverbs like now and then. As far as I can see, it is unclear whether such an 
example can be provided.25
My provisional conclusion is that the dialectical force of expressibility argu-
ments depends partly on our background theoretical assumptions. Examples like 
(18) and (25) are not problematic for someone who is interested in modeling the 
English tenses as time-shifting operators. Example (32) shows that ℒ-languages 
with double temporal indexing have important expressive limitations. But it is 
not clear that there are variants of example (32) which can show that intensional 
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25 Saarinen considers various English examples of greater complexity than (32). But I think 
none of his examples requires quadruple indexing in order to be represented in a multiply 
indexed framework. Saarinen (1978, Part II) proposes an alternative game-theoretical system 
with backwards-looking operators.
formal languages with three or more temporal indices have equally interesting 
expressive limitations.
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Appendix to chapter 1
Let ℑ = 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉 be the intended interpretation of L. The derivations that 
I give in this appendix yield the truth-conditions of some wffs of the ℒ-language 
LNKRG+ with respect to an arbitrary world w of W and an arbitrary time t of T, 
which must be thought of as the world of utterance and the time of utterance of 
the relevant English sentences. Before each derivation, I mention the steps of it 
that are of special interest in connection with the discussion of chapter 1. Right 
after each derivation step, I mention the rule or definition from which that step 
follows. Most derivation steps are based on (S1’)-(S10’) –which are the double-
index analogues of the clauses (S1)-(S10) of section 1.1– and on the clauses (N), 
(K), (R) and (G+) (see below). I also simplify the derived truth-conditions in 
ways that do not affect their contents.
Semantic clauses
The truth-value assignment of LNKRG+ with respect to ℑ is the unique five-place 
function ⟦ ⟧g, w, t, t’  with range {1, 0} such that for any variable assignment g 
(with respect to ℑ), w ∈ W, t ∈ T, t’ ∈ T, n-place predicate Π of LNKRG+, dyadic 
operator Γ of LNKRG+, singular terms α, α1 … αn of LNKRG+, wffs φ, ψ of LNKRG+, 
and variable ν of LNKRG+,
(S1’) ⟦Πα1 … αn⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff 〈Fg (α1), … Fg (αn)〉 ∈ F (Π) (〈w, t〉)
(S2’) ⟦αΓφ⟧g, w, t, t’  = 1 iff for every w’ ∈ W such that w’ ∈ F (Γ) (w, t, Fg (α)), 
⟦φ⟧ g, w’, t, t’ = 1
(S3’) ⟦Pφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’’ ＜ t and 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
(S4’) ⟦Fφ⟧g, w, t, t’  = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’ and 
⟦φ⟧ g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
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(S5’) ⟦¬φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 0
(S6’) ⟦(φ ∧ ψ)⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 and ⟦ψ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1
(S7’) ⟦(φ ∨ ψ)⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 or ⟦ψ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1
(S8’) ⟦(φ → ψ)⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 0 or ⟦ψ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1
(S9’) ⟦∃νφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff for some d ∈ D, ⟦φ⟧g[ν/d], w, t, t’ = 1
(S10’) ⟦(∀νφ)⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff for every d ∈ D, ⟦φ⟧g[ν/d], w, t, t’ = 1
(N) ⟦Nφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’, t’ = 1
(K) ⟦Kφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t = 1
(R) ⟦Rφ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’, t’ = 1
(G+) ⟦G+⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff for every t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’, ⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’’ = 1
Truth predicate
If φ is a closed wff of LNKRG+, w ∈ W, and t ∈ T,
φ IS TRUE IN LNKRG+ AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for every variable assignment g, 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t = 1
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1.) Derivation of truth-condition (5) from formula (3)
(3) P ∃x (child x ∧ (born x ∧ N F become ruler of the world x))
(5) There are times t’, t’’ such that t’ ＜ t ＜ t’’ and there is an individual d 
such that d is a child in w at t’, d is born in w at t’, and d becomes ruler 
of the world in w at t’’
Key steps of the derivation: 5, 6
Derivation: (3) IS TRUE IN LNKRG+ AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for every variable assignment g,
1. ⟦P ∃x (child x ∧ (born x ∧ N F become ruler of the world x))⟧g, w, t, t = 1
by the definition of TRUE IN LNKRG+
2. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and 
⟦∃x (child x ∧ (born x ∧ N F become ruler of the world x))⟧g, w, t’, t = 1
by (S3’) 
3. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and there is some d ∈ D such that 
⟦(child x ∧ (born x ∧ N F become ruler of the world x))⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1
by (S9’)
4. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and there is some d ∈ D such that 
⟦child x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1, ⟦born x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1, and ⟦N F become  ruler of 
the world x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1
by two applications of (S6’)
5. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and there is some d ∈ D such that 
⟦child x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1, ⟦born x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1, and ⟦F become ruler of the 
world x⟧g[x/d], w, t, t = 1
by (N) 
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6. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some d ∈ D such that 
⟦child x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1, ⟦born x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t = 1, and there is some t’’ ∈ T 
such that t ＜ t’’ and ⟦become ruler of the world x⟧g[x/d], w, t’’, t = 1
by (S4’) 
7. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some d ∈ D such that 
Fg[x/d] (x) ∈ F (child) (〈w, t’〉), Fg[x/d] (x) ∈ F (born) (〈w, t’〉), and there 
is some t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’ and Fg[x/d] (x) ∈ F (become ruler of 
the world) (〈 w, t’’〉)
by (S1’) 
8. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some d ∈ D such that 
g[x/d] (x) ∈ F (child) (〈w, t’〉), g[x/d] (x) ∈ F (born) (〈w, t’〉), and there 
is some t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’ and g[x/d] (x) ∈ F (become ruler of 
the world) (〈 w, t’’〉)
by the definition of Fg 
9. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some d ∈ D such that 
d ∈ F (child) (〈w, t’〉), d ∈ F (born) (〈w, t’〉), and there is some t’’ ∈ T 
such that t ＜ t’’ and d ∈ F (become ruler of the world) (〈 w, t’’〉)
by the convention that g[x/d] (x) = d 
10. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some d ∈ D such that 
d ∈ {x ∈ D: x is a child in w at t’}, d ∈ {x ∈ D: x is born in w at t’}, 
and there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’ and d ∈ {x ∈ D: x becomes 
ruler of the world in w at t’’}
by function application and the definition of F 
for the predicates child, born, and become ruler of the world
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11. There are times t’, t’’ such that t’ ＜ t ＜ t’’ and there is an individual d such 
that d is a child in w at t’, d is born in w at t’, and d becomes ruler of the 
world in w at t’’
simplification of step 11
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2.) Derivation of truth-condition (6) from formula (4)
(4) P K F ∀x (R drive too fast x → cite Jones x)
(6) There are times t’, t’’ such that t’ ＜ t, t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every individual d, if 
d drives too fast in w at t’, d is cited by Jones in w at t’’
Key steps of the derivation: 3, 7 
Derivation: (4) IS TRUE IN LNKRG+ AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for every variable assignment g,
1. ⟦P K F ∀x (R drive too fast x → cite Jones x)⟧g, w, t, t = 1
by the definition of TRUE IN LNKRG+
2. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and ⟦K F ∀x (R drive too fast x → 
cite Jones x)⟧w, t’, t = 1
by (S3’)
3. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and ⟦F ∀x (R drive too fast x → cite 
Jones x)⟧g, w, t’, t’ = 1
by (K)
4. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’, 
and ⟦∀x (R drive too fast x → cite Jones x)⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
by (S4’) 
5. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’, 
and, for every d ∈ D, ⟦(R drive too fast x → cite Jones x)⟧g[x/d], w, t’’, t’ = 1
by (S10’)
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6. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that 
t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every d ∈ D, if ⟦R drive too fast x⟧g[x/d], w, t’’, t’  = 1, 
then ⟦cite Jones x⟧g[x/d], w, t’’, t’ = 1
by (S8’)
7. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that 
t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every d ∈ D, if ⟦drive too fast x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t’  = 1, 
then ⟦cite Jones x⟧g[x/d], w, t’’, t’ = 1
by (R)
8. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’, 
and, for every d ∈ D, if Fg[x/d] (x) ∈ F (drive too fast) (〈w, t’〉), then 〈Fg[x/d] 
(Jones), Fg[x/d] (x)〉 ∈ F (cite) (〈w, t’’〉)
by (S1’)
9. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’, 
and, for every d ∈ D, if g[x/d] (x) ∈ F (drive too fast) (〈w, t’〉), then 
〈F (Jones), g[x/d] (x)〉 ∈ F (cite) (〈w, t’’〉)
by the definition of Fg
10. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that 
t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every d ∈ D, if d ∈ F (drive too fast) (〈w, t’〉), 
then 〈F (Jones), d〉 ∈ F (cite) (〈w, t’’〉)
by the convention that g[x/d] (x) = d
11. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t, there is some t’’ ∈ T such that 
t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every d ∈ D, if d ∈ {x ∈ D: x drives too fast in w 
at t’}, then d ∈ {x ∈ D: Jones cites x in w at t’’}
by function application and the definition 
of F for Jones, drive too fast and cite
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12. There are times t’, t’’ such that t’ ＜ t, t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every individual d, 
if d drives too fast in w at t’, d is cited by Jones in w at t’’
simplification of step 12
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3.) Derivation of truth-condition (21) from formula (23)
(23) P G+ ∃x (told x ∧ R told x)
(21) There is a time t’ such that t’ ＜ t and such that for every time t’’ such 
that t < t’’, there is a joke d such that d is told in w at t’ and d is told in 
w at t’’
Key steps of the derivation: 3, 6 
Derivation: (23) IS TRUE IN LNKRG+ AT 〈ℑ, w, t〉 iff for any variable assignment g,
1. ⟦P G+ ∃x (told x ∧ R told x)⟧g, w, t, t = 1
by the definition of TRUE IN LNKRG+
2. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and 
⟦G+ ∃x (told x ∧ R told x)⟧w, t’, t = 1
by (S3’)
3. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’, 
⟦∃x (told x ∧ R told x)⟧g, w, t’, t’’ = 1
by (G+)
4. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T such that 
t ＜ t’’, there is some d ∈ D such that d is a joke and ⟦(told x ∧ R 
told x)⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t’’ = 1
by (S9’) and the assumption that x 
ranges over jokes
5. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T 
such that t ＜ t’’, there is some d ∈ D such that d is a joke, 
⟦told x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t’’ = 1, and ⟦R told x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t’’  = 1
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by (S6’)
6. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T 
such that t ＜ t’’, there is some d ∈ D such that d is a joke, 
⟦told x⟧g[x/d], w, t’, t’’ = 1, and ⟦told x⟧g[x/d], w, t’’, t’’  = 1
by (R)
7. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’, 
there is some d ∈ D such that d is a joke, Fg[x/d] (x) ∈ F (told) (〈w, t’〉) and 
Fg[x/d] (x) ∈ F (told) (〈w, t’’〉)
by (S1’)
8. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’, 
there is some d ∈ D such that d is a joke, g[x/d] (x) ∈ F (told) (〈w, t’〉), and 
g[x/d] (x) ∈ F (told) (〈w, t’’〉)
by the definition of Fg
9. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’, 
there is some d ∈ D such that d is a joke, d ∈ F (told) (〈w, t’〉), and
d ∈ F (told, w) (〈w, t’’〉)
by the convention that g[x/d] (x) = d
10. There is some t’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t and for every t’’ ∈ T such that 
t ＜ t’’, there is some d ∈ D such that d is a joke, d ∈ {x ∈ D: x is 
told in w at t’} and d ∈ {x ∈ D: x is told in w at t’’}
by function application and the definition of F for told
11. There is a time t’ such that t’ ＜ t and such that for every time t’’ 
such that t < t’’, there is a joke d such that d is told in w at t’ and d 
is told in w at t’’
simplification of step  11
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2. Rebutting King’s argument
In this chapter I criticize King’s suggestion that double-index accounts of tenses 
and time adverbs offer ad hoc and inelegant formalizations of the sort of English 
sentences that we discussed in section 1.3. In the literature on expressibility, 
there has been a tendency to focus on ‘now’/‘then’ operators, thereby ignoring 
other interesting temporal operators that are definable in a double-index frame-
work. My analysis of King’s discussion will allow us to appreciate some of the 
advantages of introducing other kinds of double-index operators.
2.1 Four kinds of temporal operators
A variety of temporal operators can be defined in a multiply indexed framework. 
In this section I distinguish four categories of double-index temporal operators.
Standard operators
The first category of operators that I would like to mention is the category of 
standard operators. The operators P, F, H, and G of classical temporal logic be-
long to this category. Kamp’s (1968) operators Since and Until are also standard 
operators. 
Standard operators shift the first temporal index (i.e. the time of  evaluation) of 
their embedded formulas. This is one of their defining features. The other char-
acteristic feature of standard operators is that they shift the current time of 
evaluation to a time that is related to that time. The time that occupies the 
second-temporal-index slot plays no significant role in the semantic clauses of 
standard operators. This can be seen by looking back at the double-index clauses 
for P and F given in section 1.2.
It is awkward that the operators P, F, H, and G of Priorean temporal logic 
have been traditionally glossed by employing the expressions it has been the 
case that, it will be the case that, it has always been the case that, and it will al-
ways be the case that. In ordinary English, these expressions are indexical. They 
serve to talk about times that lie to the past or future of the time of speech of a 
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sentence. Standard operators only have this kind of effect when the current time 
of evaluation happens to be the speech time. This is the case when standard op-
erators are not embedded under other operators, or when the closest operators 
under which they are embedded are operators that retrieve the original time of 
utterance. But, in general, when a standard temporal operator appears embedded 
under another standard operator, its shifting action can be independent of the 
time of speech.
Indexical operators
In a double-index framework, it is possible to define temporal operators that 
shift the time of evaluation by reference to the second temporal index. The 
‘now’-operator N is one such operator. Indexical operators shift the time of 
evaluation of their embedded formulas by using the second temporal index as a 
point of reference. In a language lacking operators that shift the second temporal 
index, an indexical operator always shifts the time of evaluation by reference to 
the original time of utterance.
We can define indexical-operator correlates of the operators P and F. Let us 
call these indexical operators P* and F*. Using the framework of sections 1.1 
and 1.2, they can be defined as follows:
Let LP*F* be a double-index ℒ-language and ⟦ ⟧g, w, t, t’  be the truth-value 
assignment of LP*F* with respect to an interpretation 〈D, W, T, ＜, F〉. 
For any wff φ of LP*F*, variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, and t’ ∈ T,
(P*) ⟦P*φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’’ ＜ t’ and 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
(F*) ⟦F*φ⟧g, w, t, t’  = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’ and 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
The indexical operators P* and F* shift the current time of evaluation to a time 
that lies to the past or future of the second temporal index. 
We can also define indexical correlates of the standard operators H and G. 
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(For simplicity, in the rest of this section I will give semantic clauses without 
making explicit reference to ℒ-languages and their interpretations.)
For any wff φ, variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, and t’ ∈ T,
(H*) ⟦H*φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff for every t’’ ∈ T such that t’’ ＜ t’, ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
(G*) ⟦G*φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff for every t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’, ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’, t’ = 1
Just as the semantic clauses of P* and F* involve existential quantification over 
times that precede or follow the second temporal index, the semantic clauses of 
H* and G* involve universal quantification over times preceding or following 
the second temporal index. Of course, we could have introduced H* and G* 
simply as abbreviations of ¬P*¬ and ¬F*¬, respectively.
In languages like LN and LP*F*, the indexical operators are anchored to the 
time of utterance, even when they occur under the scope of other operators. For 
this reason, a wff of the form FNφ is equivalent to Nφ in LN and a wff of the 
form FP*φ is equivalent to P*φ in LP*F*. 
Monster operators
It is possible to define operators that shift the second temporal index. Since in 
some systems this index is the one that plays the role of time of utterance, the 
operators that shift it can be regarded as monsters in the sense of Kaplan (1977). 
Monster operators shift a given second-index-time to another time, which can be 
viewed as a new time of utterance. 
As we saw in chapter 1, Vlach’s operator K is a monster operator. It is the 
monster operator that copies the first temporal index and puts it in the position 
of the second temporal index. In other words, it turns the current time of evalua-
tion into the new time of utterance.
We can introduce monster correlates of P and F. Let us call them P+ and F+. 
Their semantic clauses are as follows:
For any wff φ, variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, and t’ ∈ T,
(P+) ⟦P+φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’’ ＜ t’ and 
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⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’’ = 1
(F+) ⟦F+⟧g, w, t, t’  = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’ ＜ t’’ and 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’’ = 1
These operators shift the current time of utterance –or, if you prefer, the second 
temporal index– to a time that precedes or follows that time. They leave the time 
of evaluation unmodified. The monster correlates of H and G, which we may 
call H+ and G+, can be introduced as abbreviations of ¬P+¬ and ¬F+¬. Notice 
that the operators P+ and F+ do not shift the time of utterance of their embedded 
formulas by relating it to the current time of evaluation. In this respect, they are 
different from K. But we can define monster analogues of P* and F* that relate 
the new time of utterance to the current time of evaluation. Let me call them P++ 
and F++.
For any wff φ, variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, and t’ ∈ T,
(P++) ⟦P++φ⟧g, w, t, t’  = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t’’ ＜ t and 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’’ = 1
(F++) ⟦F++φ⟧g, w, t, t’ = 1 iff there is some t’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’ and 
⟦φ⟧g, w, t, t’’ = 1
P++ and F++ take you to a new time of utterance that precedes or follows the 
time of evaluation. The formal properties of these two operators are similar to 
those of P* and F*. In particular, wffs of the form F+P++φ and P+F++φ are 
equivalent to P++φ and F++φ, respectively. By contrast, a wff of the form F+P+φ 
is not equivalent to P+φ and a wff of the form P+F+φ is not equivalent to F+φ. 
Thus, monster operators can be divided into two subcategories depending on 
whether they shift the current time of utterance with respect to the current time 
of evaluation or independently of it. This division is just the monster version of 
the distinction between standard operators and indexical operators.
Monster/indexical operators
We can also define double-index operators that simultaneously shift the two 
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temporal indices. I will call these operators monster/indexical operators. A group 
of operators of this type that is particularly interesting is the one that includes 
operators that shift the time of evaluation in the way standard operators do and 
that also store the new time of evaluation that they introduce. A double-index 
operator can be a monster/indexical operator. But let me define here a couple of 
monster/indexical operators of triple-index languages. In the context of a triply 
indexed language, we can define past and future operators that store their times 
in different temporal indices. Let us call these operators P*+ and F*+. They are 
defined as follows:
For any wff φ, variable assignment g, w ∈ W, t ∈ T, t’ ∈ T, and t’’ ∈ T 
(P*+) ⟦P*+φ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’ = 1 iff there is some t’’’ ∈ T such that t’’’ ＜ t 
and ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’’, t’’’, t’’ = 1
(F*+) ⟦F*+φ⟧g, w, t, t’, t’’  = 1 iff there is some t’’’ ∈ T such that t ＜ t’’’ 
and ⟦φ⟧g, w, t’’’, t’, t’’’ = 1
While P*+ stores the past time that it introduces in the second temporal index, 
F*+ introduces a future time and stores it in the third temporal index. The two 
‘then’-operators R and R’ of section 1.2 can retrieve the times that P*+ and F*+ 
store.
The classification of double-index operators presented in this section is not 
meant to be exhaustive. The operators that we have defined will suffice for the 
purposes of the next section.
2.2 King’s argument
As we saw in chapter 1, there are English sentences whose truth-conditions can 
be expressed in LN but not in L. (1) is a sentence of this sort. On the other hand, 
there are English sentences whose truth-conditions are not expressible in LN but 
are expressible in LKR. (2) is a sentence of this kind. (3) is a formula of LN that 
expresses the truth-condition of (1) and (4) is formula of LKR that expresses the 
truth-condition of (2).
(1) One day, all persons alive now will be dead
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(2) Once all persons alive then would be dead
(3) F ∀x (N alive x → dead x) 
(4) P K F ∀x (R alive x → dead x)
But even if (3)-(4) capture the truth-conditions of (1)-(2), one may think that 
(3)-(4) do not describe the logical forms of (1)-(2). This is the view that King 
(2003, pp. 221-222) advocates. He argues that if we hold that (3)-(4) are the 
logical forms of (1)-(2), we get a messy relation between the surface structures 
of (1)-(2) and their logical forms. According to King, while there is a prominent 
similarity between (1) and (2) at the level of surface syntax, (3) and (4) have 
very different structures. Whereas (3) has two temporal operators, (4) has four 
operators. King claims that this is ad hoc and points out that quantificational 
formalizations of (1)-(2) such as (5)-(6) are less ad hoc and allow for a cleaner 
relation between surface structures and logical forms. In formulas (5)-(6), the 
predicates alive and dead contain extra arguments for times. King assumes that 
the singular term t* of (5) designates the time of utterance of (1) and the term t’’ 
of (6) designates a contextually determined past time.  
(5) ∃t (t* < t ∧ ∀x (alive x t* → dead x t))
(6) ∃t (t’’ < t ∧ ∀x (alive x t’’ → dead x t))
King takes it that his observations about (1)-(6) illustrate the following point:
... treating tenses as involving quantification over times (and expressing relations between 
times) rather than index shifting sentence operators [...] allows for a more plausible ac-
count of the relation between the surface structures of English sentences and the syntactic 
representations of those sentences at the level of syntax that is the input to semantics. 
(King 2003, p. 223)
I do not dispute King’s critical remarks regarding (3)-(4). In fact, I think he is 
right in claiming that (4) contains ad hoc operators that do not correspond to any 
constituent of the surface structure of (2). Presumably, the only motivation that 
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Vlach had for positing the operators K and R in the formal representation of a 
sentence like (2) was that these operators appeared to be required in order to get 
the truth-condition of the sentence right. In my view, the controversial aspect of 
King’s discussion is his assumption that the point he makes about (3)-(4) gener-
alizes to other operator-based accounts.
The crucial point is that even though [(1)] and [(2)] appear to have the same number and 
sort of syntactic constituents combined in the same ways, and differ only in tense and the 
words ‘now’ and ‘then’, they have very different LFs: [(1)]’s LF contains two operators 
and [(2)]’s contains four! Surely  this looks ad hoc, and presupposes a very messy  relation 
between the surface structures of sentences and their LFs. Admittedly, we are looking at 
only one version of the operator approach, but such ad hocery  and messiness in the relation 
between surface structure and LF is typical of such approaches.1
(King 2003, pp. 222-223)
Pace King, an intensional semanticist can offer representations of (2) which do 
not have the defect that King mentions in the passage. The bound uses of then 
that we encounter in sentences like (2) can be formally represented with the aid 
of monster/indexical operators. On this approach, (2) can be represented as (7).
(7) P*+ F ∀x (R alive x → dead x)
The operator R of (7) retrieves the past time associated with P*+ and makes it 
the time of evaluation of the subformula alive x. The subformula dead x is 
evaluated at the future time associated with the operator F. 
(8) is the truth-condition of (7) with respect to a world of utterance w and a 
time of utterance t.
(8) There are times t’, t’’ such that t’ ＜ t, t’ ＜ t’’, and, for every individual d, 
if d is alive in w at t’, d is dead in w at t’’.
I take it that (8) specifies the intuitive reading of (2). King cannot complain that 
there is no one-to-one correspondence between the operators of (7) and the tem-
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1 I have put my own numbering in this passage. Interestingly, the last sentence of the passage 
was removed in King 2007, chapter 6 (see pp. 188-189), which is a revised version of King 
2003.
poral surface constituents of (2). One can view P*+ as representing the semantic 
contribution of once, F as representing the contribution of would, and R as rep-
resenting the contribution of then.
King might still complain that (7) has more operators than (3). He might insist 
that this is bad because (1) and (2) are very similar at the surface level. My reply 
to this objection is that the truth-condition of (1) involves two different times, 
whereas the truth-condition of (2) involves three times. For this reason, it is not 
prima facie incorrect to postulate three temporal operators in the formal repre-
sentation of (2) and just two temporal operators in the representation of (1). 
According to the semantics of chapter 1, (9) is the truth-condition of (3).
(9) There is a time t’ such that t ＜ t’ and, for every individual d, if d is alive 
in w at t, d is dead in w at t’.
As you can see, (9) differs from (8) in that (9) distinguishes between three 
times. Notwithstanding the apparent surface similarity between (1) and (2), the 
temporal expressions one day and will do not introduce two different times in 
the truth-condition of (1). By contrast, the words once and would introduce two 
different times in (2). The auxiliary would of (2) indicates that the time in which 
the persons are dead is posterior to the past time in which they were alive.  
The formulas (5) and (6) of King have the same number of temporal variables 
because King assumes that (6) contains the free variable t’’. A more orthodox 
first-order symbolization of (2) would make use of two bound variables ranging 
over times. Compare (6) and (10).
(10) ∃t ∃t’ (t < t* ∧ t < t’ ∧ ∀x (alive x t → dead x t’))
(10) has the same truth-condition as (7). King takes for granted that (6) is a good 
formalization of (2). But I contend that (2) does not have the free-variable read-
ing which Kings ascribes to it. The presence of once in (2) forces a quantified 
reading along the lines of (8). A contextually given reference time is required in 
order to interpret the deictic use of then in (11).  
(11) All persons alive then would be dead
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Without a reference time that is implicitly understood, (11) does not express a 
truth-condition. But (2) does not require a contextually salient reference time to 
be interpreted. Its intuitive reading is quantificational rather than deictic. Hence, 
(7) is more accurate as a representation of (2) than (6).
Let me stress that I am not assuming that (3) and (7) accurately represent the 
contributions of the expressions one day and once in sentences (1)-(2). An inten-
sional theorist may concede that a more sophisticated formal apparatus is needed 
in order to account for the semantics of these two expressions. My point is just 
this: from the mere fact that (3) and (7) differ in the number of operators that 
they contain one cannot infer that symbolizations with explicit temporal vari-
ables are better than (3) and (7) as formalizations of (1)-(2). King’s symboliza-
tion (6) does not have more quantifiers than (5). But we have just seen that (6) 
does not predict the right truth-condition for (2). On the other hand, (5) and (10) 
predict the desired truth-conditions. But these truth-conditions involve a differ-
ent number of times and the formulas (5) and (10) do not have the same number 
of quantifiers and bound variables.
In a revised version of his discussion, King (2007, pp. 187-189) tries to illus-
trate his point using a different group of sentences. Instead of (1)-(4), he consid-
ers sentences (12)-(14) and formulas (15)-(17).
(12) A child was born who would be king
(13) A child was born who will be king
(14) A barbarian will be king
(15) P ∃x (child x ∧ (born x ∧ F king x)) 
(16) P ∃x (child x ∧ (born x ∧ N F king x))
(17) F ∃x (barbarian x ∧ king x))
Here is what King says about (12)-(17):  
... even though [(12)] and [(13)] appear to have exactly  the same number and sort  of syn-
tactic constituents combined in the same ways, and differ only in the words ‘would’ and 
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‘will’, they  have different  LFs: [(13)]’s LF contains an additional operator (‘N’) that corre-
sponds to no operator in [(12)]’s LF. Presumably, this operator is somehow due to the pres-
ence of the word ‘will’ in [(13)]. But then when we consider a sentence containing ‘will’ 
alone, such as [(14)] presumably it will be represented as [(17)]. In the case of [(14)], ‘will’ 
only contributes one operator to its LF, whereas in [(14)] it contributes two. Surely the fact 
that the LFs for [(12)] and [(13)] contain different numbers of operators despite the fact 
that the sentences are exactly similar syntactically  and that ‘will’ contributes different 
numbers of operators to LFs in different cases looks ad hoc and presupposes a very  messy 
relation between the surface structures of sentences and their LFs.2
(King 2007, pp. 188-189)
I do not dispute King’s assumption that it is desirable to give a uniform account 
of the semantic contribution of will in sentences (13) and (14). I also agree that 
(16) and (17) are defective for this reason. However, the intensional semanticist 
does not need to resort to LN in order to symbolize (13). The indexical operator 
F* of section 2.1 provides an alternative way of symbolizing (13) and (14).
(18) P ∃x (child x ∧ (born x ∧ F* king x))
(19) ∃x (barbarian x ∧ F* king x))
The crucial thing to note here is that (15) and (18) have the same number of 
temporal operators. For this reason, King’s objection to (16) in the last quoted 
passage does not apply to (19). Moreover, (18) and (19) are not ad hoc formali-
zations in the sense of containing operators that are postulated just to obtain the 
right truth-conditions for (13) and (14). The indexical operator F* of (18) and 
(19) seems to capture the contribution of will in (13) and (14). Even though in 
(13) will appears in an embedded position, it takes us to a time posterior to the 
time of utterance. This suggests that F* is more suitable as an operator correlate 
of the English word will than F. The standard operator F, on the other hand, is 
more suitable for representing the contribution of would in (12). We would get 
the wrong truth-condition if we replaced F by F* in (15). We thus observe a nice 
correlation between the temporal surface constituents of (12)-(15), on the one 
hand, and the temporal operators of (15), (18), and (19), on the other hand. 
The important point, in any case, is that an operator-based representation of 
(13) does not need to contain more operators than the representations of (12) and 
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2 I have also put my own numbering in this passage.
(14), and we can represent the contribution of will in (13) and (14) using the 
same indexical operator. So, symbolizations (15), (18), and (19) do not have the 
problems that King mentions with respect to (15)-(17).
I hope my discussion of sentences (1)-(2) and (12)-(14) in this chapter has 
served to illustrate that ‘now’/‘then’ operators are not the only kind of operators 
to which a double-index theorist can appeal in order to give the truth-conditions 
of prima facie problematic sentences. Indexical operators, monster operators, 
and monster/indexical operators can also be used to obtain the truth-conditions 
of the English sentences discussed in this chapter.
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Part 2: Intensionality 
and Logical Form
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3. The Parallel between Pronouns, 
Tenses, and Modals
Back in the early seventies, Partee (1973) observed some similarities between 
the linguistic behavior of English personal pronouns and the behavior of the 
English tense morphemes Past and Present. She suggested that these behavioral 
analogies speak for a referential account of English tenses. Partee’s discussion 
of the parallel between tenses and pronouns was the beginning of a trend away 
from the Priorean conception of tenses as temporal operators. Many semanticists 
now accept Partee’s suggestion that the logical forms of tensed sentences have 
covert variable-like constituents which denote times. During the late nineties, a 
trend towards variable-based treatments of modality also began to emerge.1 The 
traditional account of modals as intensional operators, which is still accepted by 
many, has been challenged by several theorists. One crucial line of argument 
against the operator-based account of modality starts from the observation that 
modals exhibit all the pronoun-like behaviors of Past and Present which Partee 
described in her seminal paper. It is then argued that, just as in the case of tense, 
this fact provides a motivation for adopting a variable-based approach to modal 
talk. The first author who suggested that Partee’s original analogies extend to the 
domain of modality was Stone (1997).
This chapter is devoted to examining some of the key examples that Partee 
and Stone proposed in order to illustrate the parallel between pronouns, tenses, 
and modals. Partee’s examples are presented in section 3.1 and Stone’s examples 
are presented in section 3.2. In section 3.3 I challenge the suggestion that, taken 
together, the two groups of examples support the view that intensional operators 
must be dispensed with in favor of variable-based representations.
I present a formal analysis of tenses and modals as context-sensitive operators 
in section 3.3. I argue that this analysis can predict the right truth-conditions for 
the English sentences in which Partee and Stone were interested. The formal 
representations that my analysis posits are similar in various respects to the for-
mulas of the operator-based languages that we discussed in chapters 1 and 2. But 
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1 For useful references to this literature on modality, see Schlenker 2006 and Schaffer 2012, 
section 2.
they have a novel feature: they employ predicate-forming operators that act on 
sub-predicative syntactic constituents. I will call these constituents radicals. In 
chapter 4 I will propose an account of tenses that is more sophisticated than the 
analysis of this chapter and which does no model tenses as operators that act on 
radicals. However, I think that the analysis of tenses outlined in this chapter has 
some theoretical interest. For this analysis abandons the assumption that the 
temporal operators that represent tenses are sentential operators. As I mentioned 
in the introduction, the possibility of dispensing with this assumption while still 
endorsing an intensional account of English tenses has not been explored in the 
literature. 
3.1 The parallel between pronouns and tenses
Let us take a look at the parallel between pronouns and tenses as introduced in 
Partee 1973. Sentences (1), (3), and (5) illustrate three prototypical uses of pro-
nouns. Sentences (2), (4), and (6) illustrate what Partee took to be the temporal 
analogues of such uses.2
   Deictic reference
   (1) She left me
   (2) I didn’t turn off the stove
   Anaphoric reference
   (3) Sam took the car yesterday and Sheila took it today
   (4a) Sheila had a party and Sam got drunk
   (4b) When Susan walked in, Peter left
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2 Partee offered a more sophisticated taxonomy of the relevant uses of pronouns and tenses in 
a later paper (Partee 1984, pp. 244-247). In that paper she reappraisses her argument line in 
Partee 1973 and ends up advocating a dynamic account of tense.
   Bound reference
   (5) Every woman believes that she is happy
   (6a) Whenever Mary smiled, Sam yawned
   (6b) When Mary telephoned, Sam was always asleep
Partee relied on examples such as (1)-(6) to advocate a variable-based approach 
to the semantics of tenses. As she put it: “…there is a considerable and striking 
parallel in the behavior of tenses and pronouns, at least in English. The corollary 
seems to be that if pronouns have to be treated as variables and not as sentence 
operators […] the same must be true for tenses…” (Partee 1973 p. 609). Partee 
did not provide specific formalizations of her own examples. For purely illustra-
tive purposes, let us consider a simple formalization of (2) containing a temporal 
variable.
   (LF2) ¬Turn-off (I, the stove, t)
In (LF2), Turn-off  is a triadic predicate, I is the first-person individual constant 
of Kaplan’s LD formal language (see Kaplan 1989, section XVIII), the stove is a 
definite description, and t is a free variable ranging over past intervals of time.
   Here is a way of conceiving of the semantics of logical form (LF2). When (2) 
is felicitously uttered, the context of utterance determines an assignment func-
tion gc that assigns a value to the time variable t. Intuitively, gc(t) is the specific 
past interval that is relevant for the evaluation of (2) in that context. If one as-
sumes that the propositional contribution of a free variable is the individual that 
it denotes in a given context, the semantic content of (LF2) may be thought of as 
a time-specific but world-neutral proposition, namely, a proposition that is true 
in a world w iff ac (the agent of the context) did not turn off the relevant stove in 
w during the time interval gc(t).
   I must stress that this is just one possible way to go. In what follows I will use 
formalizations like (LF2) to illustrate how a variable-based account of tenses 
may work. Needless to say, there are more sophisticated variants of the variable 
approach (see e.g. Enç 1987 and Ogihara 1996). One does not need to assume, 
for example, that t is a free variable. The logical form of (3) might involve a 
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quantified rather than a free variable. Moreover, one does not need to think that 
variables are context-sensitive expressions that take different values in different 
contexts. Some authors rely on this conception of variables (see e. g. Stanley 
2007). But Kaplan himself did not treat variables this way in his LD formal sys-
tem.
   (LF4b) and (LF6a) are possible formalizations of sentences (4b) and (6a) 
along the lines of (LF2).
   (LF4b) Walk-in (Susan, t) ∧ Leave (Peter, t)
   (LF6a) ∀t (Smile (Mary, t) → Yawn (Sam, t))
One may think of the content of (LF4b) as a time-specific but world-neutral 
proposition. Such a proposition would be true in a world w iff Susan walks in w 
during gc(t) and Peter leaves in w during gc(t). Similarly, the semantic content of 
(LF6a) may be thought of as a time-specific/world-neutral proposition that is 
true in a world w iff, for every past time interval t having a contextually con-
strained size, if Mary smiles in w during t, then Sam yawns in w during t. The 
size of the interval must be constrained because we do not judge (6a) as being 
true if a very long period of time separates the smiling by Mary and the yawning 
by John.
   A variant of (LF4b) may contain two different variables t and t’ appearing in 
the predicates Walk-in (Susan, t) and Leave (Peter, t’). In normal contexts of ut-
terance, these variables are interpreted in such a way that gc(t) = gc(t’). But, in 
principle, there might be contexts of utterance in which the intervals gc(t) and 
gc(t’) are not identical.
3.2 Extending the parallel
As I mentioned above, Stone (1997, section 2) argued that Partee’s parallel be-
tween pronouns and tenses can be extended to the realm of modality. English 
modals, he claimed, exhibit the whole range of pronoun-like uses of tenses ob-
served in Partee 1973/1984. Stone proposed examples such as (7) - (9) to illus-
trate how modals can refer to hypothetical scenarios in a variety of ways.3 The 
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3 Speas (2004) and Schaffer (2012, section 2.1) provide further examples. 
interpretation of these examples is not uncontroversial. The contrast between (8) 
and (9) can be better understood by thinking of the relevant scenarios as abstract 
situations (see Barwise and Perry 1983).
   Imagine a speaker uttering (7) while looking at a guitar amplifier in a store.
   (7) My father would kill me
Here the context of utterance makes salient a hypothetical scenario in which the 
speaker buys the amplifier and plays his guitar with it at home. (7) serves to 
communicate that if this scenario obtained, the speaker’s father would react vio-
lently. This, Stone suggests, is comparable to what we observe in (1) and (2). 
The utterance of each sentence involves an entity –a person, an interval, and a 
hypothetical scenario, respectively– that becomes salient by virtue of the extra-
linguistic context.
 
   (8) If I had a party at my place, my neighbor would call the police
(8) is the modal analogue of (3)-(4). Just as the first conjunct of (4a) introduces 
a reference time interval relative to which its second conjunct is interpreted, so 
too the antecedent of (8) serves to specify a concrete scenario against which its 
consequent must be assessed.
   (9) If Mary married one of my brothers, Sarah would envy her
Intuitively, sentence (9) does not concern a single hypothetical scenario. Rather, 
it specifies a class of such scenarios –at a minimum, one scenario for each 
brother the speaker has– and states that each scenario belonging to this class is 
one in which Sarah envies Mary. (9) thus seems to involve bound reference to 
certain hypothetical scenarios. In this respect, it parallels (5)-(6).
   If Stone’s argument is correct, (1)-(9) illustrate a structural parallel between 
pronouns, tenses, and modals in English. If this result is analyzed in the light of 
the argument discussed in the previous section, the natural conclusion to draw is 
that English logical forms do not contain modal or temporal operators. Rather, 
they contain implicit variables that make deictic, anaphoric, and bound reference 
to times and possibilia. An account of this sort can be implemented in various 
ways. For illustrative purposes, let us briefly consider a variant of the account in 
question that formalizes (7) and (9) along the lines of (LF2) and (LF6a). 
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   (LF7) Kill (I’s father, I, s, t) 
   (LF9) ∀s ∀x ((Brother (I, x, s, t) ∧ Marry (Mary, x, s, t)) → Envy (Sarah, 
Mary, s, t))
In (LF7) and (LF9), all predicates contain an argument place for a time and also 
an argument place for a situation. s is a variable ranging over situations that are 
accessible from the context of utterance (which is also situation) according to a 
contextual relation of accessibility. t is a variable standing for a contextually 
given present time interval (i.e. an interval that includes the time of utterance). 
   (LF7) can only be interpreted if the context of utterance provides a specific 
value for the situation variable s. In our example, this contextual value is the hy-
pothetical scenario in which the speaker buys the amplifier and makes noise 
with it at home. The content of (LF7) is a time/situation-specific proposition that 
is true iff in that scenario ac’s father kills ac during the present interval gc(t).
   (LF9) aims to capture the reading of (9) in which the speaker is talking about 
her actual brothers, as opposed to the non-actual brothers that she may have in a 
counterfactual scenario. I assume that only scenarios involving actual brothers 
are contextually accessible. The content of (LF9) is a time/situation-specific 
proposition that is true iff, for every accessible scenario s, if Mary marries one 
of ac’s actual brothers in s during gc(t), then Sarah envies Mary in s during gc(t).
3.3 Radicals
In this section I want to propose an analysis of the examples that we considered 
in the previous two sections. The analysis is based on two ideas. The first idea is 
that intensional operators can be context-sensitive. It is possible to define tem-
poral operators that shift a given time of evaluation to a time that is included in 
some contextually given interval of time. There can also be modal operators that 
are sensitive to some situation or set of worlds that is contextually given. The 
second idea is that tenses and modals can be represented as intensional operators 
that act on radicals. I argue that the truth-conditions of the examples considered 
in sections 3.1 and 3.2 can be correctly predicted by an account that combines 
these two ideas. If I succeed in this task, the moral of the discussion of this 
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chapter is that one can account for the uses of tenses and modals in which Partee 
and Stone were interested without postulating implicit world/time arguments. 
We may grant that tenses and modals behave in pronoun-like ways while still 
insisting that there is a fundamental distinction between reference and predica-
tion in natural languages. On the view that I propose in this section, personal 
pronouns belong to the referential side of this dichotomy, whereas tenses and 
modals belong to the predicative side.
3.3.1 Deictic uses of tenses and modals
Let us consider once again a deictic use of the English morpheme Past.4
   (10) I frowned
I will assume that the utterance of (10) concerns a contextually provided past 
time interval. The communicative intention of the speaker is to talk about what 
she did during that interval of time –as opposed to the whole past.
Let me introduce the account I want to propose in this chapter by interpreting 
(10). Prima facie, in a sentence like (10) Past does not modify the whole senten-
tial formula I frown, but only its verb. This is what surface syntax suggests. Let 
PAST  be a non-sentential operator that acts on pre-predicative constituents. I will 
call such constituents radicals.5 Syntactically, radicals are expressions that give 
rise to predicates when combined with temporal operators such as PAST. Seman-
tically, they get standard predicate extensions relative to worlds and time inter-
vals. The interpretation of an n-ary radical φ x1, …xn is a function mapping 
world/time-interval pairs onto sets of n-tuples of individuals. Let W, T, and I be 
the set of all worlds, the set of all time intervals (I will call them times), and the 
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4 Following Partee’s discussion, I use the labels ‘deictic’, ‘anaphoric’, and ‘bound’ to classify 
the uses of tenses and modals that we have been considering here. However, these labels are 
innacurate in the context of the operator-based account that I will put forward in this chapter. 
On my account, sentences (2), (4), and (6) do not involve reference to times. Therefore, there 
is no deixis, anaphora or variable-binding taking place in the logical forms of such sentences.
5 The examples discussed in Enç 1986 –where tense does not seem to affect the interpretation 
of nominal phrases– provide a motivation for formalizing tenses as non-sentential operators.
set of all individuals. Let ⊆ be the inclusion relation for time intervals. Finally, 
let < be the earlier-later relation between time intervals.6
Let FROWN be the radical associated with the English verb frown. Here is the 
semantic clause that defines the interpretation of FROWN: 
⎪FROWN x⎪ = f : W  T → ℘(I), for any 〈w, t〉 ∈ W  T, 
f (〈w, t〉) = {i: i frowns in w at t}
As you can see, ⎪FROWN x⎪ is the function which maps any world/time pair to 
the set of individuals that frown in the world of the pair at the time of the pair.
When an n-adic radical φ x1, …xn is modified by the operator PAST, we obtain 
a predicate of the form PASTφ x1, …xn.7 In classical temporal logic, a formula of 
the form Pφ is true at a time t just in case there is a time t’ such that t’ < t and φ 
is true at t’. We could interpret the predicates of the form PASTφ x1, …xn along 
similar lines.
⎪PASTφ x1, …xn⎪ = f : W  T → ℘(In), for any 〈w, t〉 ∈ W  T, 
f (〈w, t〉) = {〈i1, …in〉: there is a time t’ < t 
such that 〈i1, …in〉 ∈⎪φ x1, …xn⎪(w, t’)}
According to this definition, the extension of PASTφ x1, …xn relative to a given 
world/time pair 〈w, t〉 is the set consisting of every n-tuple of individuals such 
that, for some time t’ that precedes t, the n-tuple appears in the extension of φ x1, 
…xn relative to 〈w, t’〉. Given this general definition, and given our interpretation 
of the radical FROWN x, the interpretation of the predicate PASTFROWN x can be 
easily computed.
⎪PASTFROWN x⎪ = f : W  T → ℘(I), for any 〈w, t〉 ∈ W  T,  f (〈w, t〉) = 
{i: there is a time t’ < t such that i frowns in w during t’}
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6 Intervals are sets of instants. Given two intervals t and t’, t < t’ iff every instant of t precedes 
every  instant of t’ and t ⊆ t’ iff every instant of t is also an instant of t’. For a definition of the 
notion of interval, see e.g. Ogihara 1996, p. 24.
7 Here the variables appearing in front of φ are not under the scope of PAST. Radical operators 
can only take scope over radicals. This is an important feature of the present formalization, 
since it is what allows us to avoid potential scope conflicts generated by  the interaction be-
tween nominal phrases and tenses (see Enç 1986).
Let wc and tc be the world and time of utterance of (10). If we give the function 
⎪PASTFROWN x⎪ the pair 〈wc, tc〉 as argument, this function yields the set of 
those individuals that have frowned in wc during some time preceding tc. Thus, if 
we analyze (10) as being true just in case the speaker of c is a member of this 
set, we get the wrong truth-condition for (10). As I mentioned before, the utter-
ance of (10) concerns a specific past interval, not the whole past relative to tc.
   There was something right and something wrong about our previous semantic 
clause for PASTφ x1, …xn. The right part was the idea that tenses shift the point 
of evaluation. When (10) is uttered, what matters in order to determine whether 
it expresses a truth in context is not what is the case at the time of utterance, but 
rather what was the case at some past time. What was wrong with the clause was 
the idea of accounting for this assessment shift by unrestrictedly quantifying 
over past times. In order to fix this problem, we must redefine ⎪PASTφ x1, …xn⎪.
   I will assume that PAST is context-sensitive in two ways. It requires two dif-
ferent times t and t’ that should be contextually determined. Think of t as a time 
of utterance and think of t’ as an evaluation time lying to the past of t. These two 
times are analogues of Reichenbach’s (1947, §51) point of speech and point of 
the event.
   The new ⎪PASTφ x1, …xn⎪ is defined as follows:
⎪PASTφ x1, …xn⎪ = f : W  T  T → ℘(In), for any 〈w, t, t’〉 ∈ W  T  T,  
f (〈w, t, t’〉) = {〈i1, …in〉: there is a time t’’ such that t’’ < t, t’’ ⊆ t’, 
and 〈i1, …in〉 ∈ ⎪φ x1, …xn⎪(w, t’’)}
⎪PASTφ x1, …xn⎪ maps any given 〈w, t, t’〉 triple onto the set of those n-tuples 
〈i1, …in〉 that appear in the range of the function ⎪φ x1, …xn⎪ when a time t’’ ly-
ing to the past of t and mereologically contained in t’ is given as input to that 
function. Let us see what the interpretation of the predicate PASTFROWN x is 
given our redefinition of ⎪PASTφ x1, …xn⎪.
⎪PASTFROWN x⎪ = f : W  T  T → ℘(I), for any 〈w, t, t’〉 ∈ W  T  T, 
f (〈w, t, t’〉) = {i: i frowns in w at some time t’’ such that 
t’’ < t and t’’ ⊆ t’}
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If we fix the first two argument-positions of ⎪PASTFROWN x⎪ by choosing wc 
and tc, the interpretation of PASTFROWN x relative to wc and tc can be seen as a 
function from evaluation times to sets of individuals.
 
⎪PASTFROWN x⎪wc, tc = f : T → ℘(I), for any t ∈ T, f (t) = {i: i frowns in 
wc at some time t’ such that t’ < tc and t’ ⊆ t}
Let us call tFROWN(c) the evaluation time that is assigned to FROWN x in the context 
of utterance c. If, for instance, the speaker of (10) is intuitively talking about 
what she did on the very day of speech, then tFROWN(c) is the day of utterance of 
(10). 
⎪PASTFROWN x⎪c = {i: i frowns in wc at some time t such that t < tc 
and t ⊆ tFROWN(c)}
This is the interpretation of the predicate PASTFROWN x in c. By replacing x with 
the first-person constant I, we obtain the sentential formula PASTFROWN I, 
which is the logical form of (10). The truth-conditions of this formula, relative 
to c, can be easily derived given two standard semantic clauses.
First clause: ⎪I⎪c = ac
Second clause: If Π is an n-adic predicate and α1…αn are singular terms, 
Πα1…αn is true in c iff 〈⎪α1⎪c, …⎪αn⎪c 〉 ∈ ⎪Π⎪c
From these clauses and our interpretation of PASTFROWN x with respect to c we 
can infer that PASTFROWN I is true in a context of utterance c iff ac frowns in wc 
during some time t such that t < tc and t ⊆ tFROWN(c). In other words, (10) is true in 
c just in case the speaker of c has frowned in the world of utterance during the 
contextually determined past interval tFROWN(c). I take it that this is the right truth-
condition for (10). 
   We can introduce a radical operator for the simple future by slightly modifying 
our semantic clause for PAST.
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⎪FUTφ x1, …xn⎪ = f : W  T  T → ℘(In), for any 〈w, t, t’〉 ∈ W  T  T, 
f (〈w, t, t’〉) = {〈i1, …in〉: there is a time t’’ such that 
t < t’’, t’’ ⊆ t’, and 〈i1, …in〉 ∈ ⎪φ x1, …xn⎪(w, t’’)}
The operators PAST and FUT are sensitive to a distinction between the time of 
utterance and the time of evaluation. In principle, it is possible to define other 
radical operators that allow for a distinction between the time of utterance, the 
time of evaluation, and the reference time. As Reichenbach observed, some fa-
miliar temporal constructions –e.g. the English past and future perfect– call for 
such a distinction.
   In order to preserve the parallel between tense and modality, let us see how our 
analysis of (10) can be extended to account for the truth-condition of (7). 
   (7) My father would kill me
I shall formalize (7) by using sets of possible worlds –as opposed to scenarios/
situations. On the formalization that I want to propose, the modal verb would is 
semantically represented as a radical operator (called WOULD) that modifies the 
radical KILL x y. To evaluate a sentential formula containing the predicate 
WOULDKILL x y, a time of evaluation and a set of worlds must be contextually 
provided. Intuitively, (7) concerns a set of worlds where the speaker buys the 
guitar amplifier and uses it during a contextually given present time interval. 
Not every possible world that fits this general description, though, is a member 
of the set of worlds in question. Only worlds that fit the description and are 
similar to the world of utterance in certain relevant respects can be included in 
that set (see Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis 1973). Here are the semantic clauses of 
WOULD and KILL x y:
⎪KILL x y⎪ = f : W  T → ℘(I  I), for any 〈w, t〉 ∈ W  T,  
f (〈w, t〉) = {〈i, j〉: i kills j in w during t}
⎪WOULDφ x1, …xn⎪ = f : ℘(W)  T → ℘(In), for any 〈V, t〉 ∈ ℘(W)  T, 
f (〈V, t〉) = {〈i1, …in〉: for every w ∈ V, there is a time t’ ⊆ t 
such that 〈i1, …in〉 ∈ ⎪φ x1, …xn⎪(w, t’)}
⎪WOULDφ x1, …xn⎪ is a function mapping set-of-worlds/time pairs to standard 
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predicate extensions –i.e. sets of n-tuples of individuals. ⎪WOULDKILL x y⎪ is a 
function mapping such pairs to sets of pairs of individuals.
⎪WOULDKILL x y⎪ = f : ℘(W)  T → ℘(I  I), for any 〈V, t〉 ∈ ℘(W)  T,  
f (〈V, t〉) = {〈i, j〉: for every w ∈ V, there is a 
time t’ ⊆ t such that i kills j in w during t’}
Let tKILL(c) and VKILL(c) be the time and set of worlds that serve to interpret (7) in 
a context of utterance c. tKILL(c) is a present time interval. VKILL(c) is a set contain-
ing all the worlds relevantly similar to wc (given a contextual standard of simi-
larity) where ac plays her guitar with the store amplifier at some time during 
tKILL(c). Armed with tKILL(c) and VKILL(c), we can compute ⎪WOULDKILL x y⎪c.
⎪WOULDKILL x y⎪c  = {〈i, j〉: for every w ∈ VKILL(c), there is a time t ⊆ tKILL(c) 
such that i kills j in w during t}
The logical form of (7) is the formula WOULDKILL f(I) I. I assume that f(α) is a 
singular-term functor such that ⎪f(α)⎪c denotes the father of ⎪α⎪c. According to 
our semantics, WOULDKILL f(I) I is true in a context of utterance c iff, for every 
w ∈ VKILL(c), there is a time t ⊆ tKILL(c) such that ac’s father kills ac in w during t. 
Consequently, (9) is true in c just in case the speaker of c is killed by her father 
during the present interval tKILL(c) at any world of VKILL(c) –which is a set of 
worlds containing the hypothetical possibilities that are contextually salient in c. 
This is the right truth-condition for (7).
3.3.2 Anaphoric and bound uses of tenses and modals
In this subsection I am going to formalize examples (4a), (6a), (8) and (9) of 
sections 3.1 and 3.2. They correspond to the anaphoric and bound uses of Past 
and would.
   Regarding (4a), I assume that we have two monadic radicals HAS-A-PARTY x 
and GET-DRUNK x. The logical form of (4a) is (F4a).
   (4a) Sheila had a party and Sam got drunk
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   (F4a) PAST HAS-A-PARTY Sheila ∧ PAST GET-DRUNK Sam
The analysis of the deictic uses of Past proposed in the previous subsection pre-
dicts the following truth-conditions for (4a) relative to a context c:
(4a) is true in c iff Sheila has a party in wc during some time t such that t < tc 
and t ⊆ tPARTY(c), and Sam gets drunk in wc during some time t’ such that t’ < tc 
and t’ ⊆ tDRUNK(c)
The anaphoric reading of (4a) arises when it is assumed that Sam’s drunkenness 
episode occurred during Sheila’s party. This amounts to assuming that tDRUNK(c) ⊆ 
tPARTY(c). But this assumption is not encoded in the truth-condition of sentence 
(4a). Arguably, there are possible contexts of utterance where such assumption 
should be avoided in order to interpret (4a) correctly. On my account, the choice 
of a time interval for a radical operator is a matter of pragmatics. The inclusion 
relations between the past time associated with HAS-A-PARTY x and the past in-
terval associated with GET-DRUNK x may vary depending on the context.
   Let us now turn to (6a).
   (6a) Whenever Mary smiled, Sam yawned
We have seen how to define the truth-in-context of a sentential formula like 
PASTFROWN I. If we assume that the world and time of utterance are fixed, we 
can also define a notion of truth with respect to a context and a past time of 
evaluation. Let us apply this idea to the sentential formulas PASTSMILE Mary 
and PASTYAWN Sam.
PASTSMILE Mary is true in context c during time t iff Mary smiles in wc dur-
ing some time t’ such that t’ < tc and t’ ⊆ t
PASTYAWN Sam is true in context c during time t iff Sam yawns in wc during 
some time t’ such that t’ < tc and t’ ⊆ t
Let WHENEVER be a dyadic sentential operator defined as follows:
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WHENEVER (φ, γ) is true in c iff, for every time t that does not exceed a 
contextual maximal size zc, if φ is true in wc during t, then γ is true in wc 
during t
The truth-in-context for formulas of the form WHENEVER (φ, γ) is defined in 
terms of the notion of truth with respect to a context and a time of evaluation as 
applied to the embedded sentential formulas φ and γ. As in section 3.1, the con-
textually constrained size is introduced in order guarantee that the event-type 
described by φ and the event-type described by γ are not too distant in time for 
the standards of the context.
   We can now compute the interpretation of (F6a).
   (F6a) WHENEVER (PASTSMILE Mary, PASTYAWN Sam)
WHENEVER (PASTSMILE Mary, PASTYAWN Sam) is true in c iff, for every 
time t that does not exceed a contextual maximal size zc and such that t < tc, if 
Mary smiles in wc during t, then Sam yawns in wc during t.
Finally, let us turn our attention to (8) and (9).
 
   (8) If I had a party at my place, my neighbor would call the police
   (9) If Mary married one of my brothers, Sarah would envy her
I assume that the function of the antecedents of (8) and (9) is to restrict the set of 
worlds that is required for the application of the radical operator WOULD. Thus, 
in (8) the predicate WOULDCALL-THE-POLICE x is evaluated in context c with 
respect to a set VCALL(c) containing worlds in which ac has a party at her place 
during the present time interval tCALL(c). Such worlds must also be similar to wc in 
the contextually relevant ways. In (9) the predicate WOULDENVY x y is assessed 
in context c with respect to a set VENVY(c) containing worlds in which Mary mar-
ries one of ac’s actual brothers. The predicted truth-conditions of (8) and (9), 
relative to c, appear below:
(8) is true in c iff,  for every w ∈ VCALL(c), if ac has a party at ac’s place in w 
during tHAD-PARTY(c), then ac’s neighbor calls the police in w during tCALL(c).
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(9) is true in c iff,  for every w ∈ VENVY(c), if Mary marries an actual bother of 
ac in w during tMARRY(c), then Sarah envies Mary in w during tENVY(c).
This completes my analysis of the logical forms of examples (4a), (6a), (8) and 
(9). I conclude that the deictic, anaphoric, and bound uses of English tenses and 
pronouns can be accounted for by the radical-operator approach to tense and 
modality that I sketched in this chapter.
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4. Embedded Tenses
Embedded tenses pose a challenge to any semantic theory of temporal discourse. 
In this chapter I propose an intensional account of English embedded tenses. On 
the account that I will present, the semantic job of a tense is to specify a relation 
between a perspective time and the time at which an eventuality takes place. By 
default, the time of utterance is the perspective time that a tense takes as input. 
But a switch of perspective time can be triggered when a tense appears in certain 
grammatical environments. I will suggest that intensional verbs and modals are 
triggers of perspective time shifts.
The account proposed in this chapter can conceivably be implemented using 
different formal frameworks. I will adopt here an intensional framework. I want 
to offer a plausible alternative to the various referential theories that have been 
dominant in the linguistic literature on embedded tenses since the eighties. 
These theories posit LF-representations containing variable-like constituents that 
denote time intervals. The formal framework that I am going to adopt also uses 
syntactic structures that are in line with modern generative syntax. However, 
while referential theories rely on binding principles to account for the interpreta-
tion of embedded tenses, my account relies on intensional time-shifting mecha-
nisms. Although my account is intensional, it dispenses with the assumption that 
tenses must be represented as sentential operators. I presented an account that 
that gets rid of this assumption in the previous chapter. The account presented in 
this chapter is more sophisticated semantically and syntactically.
The behavior of English tenses in embedded positions is quite complex and I 
will not attempt to account for all the puzzling facts about embedded tenses that 
have been examined in the linguistic literature. My discussion will be focused 
on the behavior of the English past tense in the two types of embedded clauses 
that have received most attention in the literature: complement clauses and rela-
tive clauses. I will show that the account proposed in this chapter predicts the 
different kinds of shifted interpretations that the English past gets in both types 
of clauses. At the end of the chapter I will suggest that my account is compatible 
with the postulation of a sequence-of-tense rule for English. This rule accounts 
for the simultaneous (or overlapping) interpretations of the English past tense in 
past-under-past environments.
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4.1 An intensional semantic framework
This section is devoted to introducing the semantic framework with which I will 
work in the rest of the chapter. As I said above, I want to propose an account that 
analyzes English tenses as intensional time-shifting devices. I want to flesh out 
this idea in such a way that the inputs to semantic interpretation are structures 
that are well motivated from a syntactic perspective and that can be interpreted 
with a standard compositional semantics. I will adopt the view that the inputs to 
semantic interpretation are LF-representations (LFs) of the LF-component of a 
generative grammar. My assumptions about syntax will be presented in the next 
section. The semantic framework that I will adopt is a Heim-and-Kratzer-style 
intensional framework. I am going to assume that the reader is familiar with the 
λ-notation and the type-driven interpretation rules of Heim and Kratzer.1 If there 
are readers who are not quite familiar with the technical semantic machinery 
employed in this chapter, they are invited to take a look at the appendix to the 
chapter. There they will find definitions of the key semantic notions that I will 
be taking for granted as well as formulations of the relevant interpretation rules.
In the semantic framework that I am going to adopt here, LFs are interpreted 
via lexical entries and interpretation rules which jointly determine intensions. 
These entries and rules are given in a typed system of semantic domains. In this 
section I introduce the notions of semantic type and semantic domain, describe 
the form of the interpretation function of my account, and adopt some assump-
tions about the denotations of English words of certain categories. I will not add 
new rules to the stock of interpretation rules of Heim and Kratzer.
Habitual and generic (readings of) English sentences are not analyzed in this 
chapter. I will focus my attention on episodic sentences. I will adopt the view 
that eventualities are the truth-makers of episodic sentences.2 On this view, an 
episodic sentence is true or false by virtue of the existence of an eventuality with 
certain characteristics. These characteristics are specified in the truth-condition 
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1 See Heim and Kratzer 1998, esp. pp. 34-39, 43-45, 92-98, 110-115, 184-188, 242-243, and 
303-309. The more recent (but yet unpublished) textbook of von Fintel and Heim (2011) dis-
cusses in greater detail how the original framework of Heim and Kratzer can be extended to 
deal with intensional discourse.
2 The term ‘eventuality’ was coined by Bach (1981). 
of the sentence. I will not make substantive ontological assumptions about the 
nature of eventualities, but I will assume that events and states are eventualities.
Let me now make some remarks about semantic types and domains. Our basic 
semantic types will be the types e (the type of individuals), l (the type of eventu-
alities), t (the type of truth-values), and s (the type of world/time coordinates). 
The building-blocks of semantic domains will be the set of all possible worlds 
(let us call it W), the set of all moments (let us call it M), the relation of temporal 
precedence between moments (which I symbolize as <), the set of individuals 
that inhabit worlds/moments (let us call it D), the set of possible eventualities 
(let us call it E), and the truth-values 1 (truth) and 0 (falsity).3 Intervals of time 
are sets of moments with no internal gaps. I will call T the set of all intervals and 
I will call the elements of T times. ＜ is the relation of total temporal precedence 
between times and ⊆ is the inclusion relation between times.4 Our basic domains 
will be the sets De (= D), Dt (= {1, 0}), Dl (= E), and Ds (= W × T). Non-basic 
types and non-basic domains are recursively specified in the usual way.5
I assume that LFs have extensions of type t and singular terms extensions of 
type e. I also assume that the extensions of verb phrases are of type <l, <e, t>>. 
In other words, verb phrase extensions are functions which map eventualities to 
functions that map individuals to truth-values. Intensions will be for us functions 
mapping pairs of worlds and times to extensions. Thus, the intensions of LFs are 
of type <s, t>, the intensions of singular terms are of type <s, e>, and the inten-
sions of verb phrases are of type <s, <l, <e, t>>>. I will assume that aspectual 
features turn verb phrase extensions into extensions of type <e, t>, while tenses 
and modals turn intensions of type <s, <e, t>> into extensions of type <e, t>.
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3 In chapter 1 I assumed that the precedence relation of an intended model was a strict linear 
order. Here I will also assume that < is a strict linear order.
4 The key semantic notions introduced in this paragraph, including the notion of interval and 
the relations ＜ and ⊆, are defined in the appendix to this chapter.
5 For definitions of the notions of time interval, semantic type, and semantic domains, see the 
appendix to this chapter. Heim and Kratzer (1998, p. 303) treat e and t as the only  basic types 
(see also von Fintel & Heim 2011, p. 10). Although s is not a basic type in their framework, 
they  introduce a rule that generates a type <s, σ> for any given type σ (Eventualities are not 
mentioned in Heim and Kratzer’s definition of a semantic type. But see Kratzer 1998). Even 
though s and l  are basic types in the present framework, e and t have a special status according 
to the account of tenses proposed in this chapter. Whereas there are English constituents with 
extensions of type e or of type t, there are no English constituents with extensions or inten-
sions of type s or of type l.
Following Kamp and Reyle (1993, chapter 5), I would like to distinguish four 
distinct roles that times play in the interpretation of temporal discourse. A time 
can play the role of a location time, a reference point, a perspective point, or a 
time of eventuality. A time of eventuality is the time at which the eventuality de-
scribed by an episodic sentence occurs. In the semantic framework adopted here, 
a time of eventuality is a time of evaluation in the traditional sense. Location 
times are intervals that restrict the temporal location of an eventuality. They can 
be specified by locating adverbs such as yesterday or on Sunday. They can also 
remain implicit. In Partee’s scenario involving an utterance of I didn’t turn off 
the stove, the location time is salient but implicit. Reference times are times that 
help to determine temporal motion in discourse. When a sentence is uttered in 
the context of a discourse, its reference time is typically provided by the nearest 
eventive sentence which precedes that sentence. The sentence is interpreted as 
describing an eventuality that stands in a certain temporal relation to the current 
reference time. This relation is usually a relation of posteriority if the sentence is 
eventive and a relation of overlap if the sentence is stative. The choice of the 
relevant relation, however, depends on various semantic and pragmatic factors. 
A perspective time is the temporal point of view from which an eventuality is 
characterized. The time of utterance of a sentence often plays the role of per-
spective time. But other times can play this role too. Later on I will suggest that 
modals and intensional verbs can take a given time of eventuality and turn it into 
a perspective time.6 The notion of perspective time will be central to my account 
of embedded tenses.
I will assume that English syntactic structures are interpreted by a seven-place 
interpretation function ⟦ ⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t. This functions takes as inputs a phrase 
structure subtree, an assignment g, a context of utterance c, a world of evalua-
tion w, a reference time Rt, a perspective time Pt, and a time of evaluation t. Its 
output is the extension of the given phrase structure subtree with respect to g, c, 
w, Rt, Pt, and t. I omit the location-time-parameter for the sake of simplicity. 
The other temporal roles mentioned in the previous paragraph are represented as 
arguments of the interpretation function. Assignments are by definition partial 
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6 Kamp and Reyle (1993, pp. 593-596) argue that the roles of reference time and perspective 
time have to be distinguished by considering extended flashbacks. For a discussion of the role 
of perspective times in indirect discourse, see Altshuler 2008.   
injective functions from the set of natural numbers to D.7 I will assume that each 
context determines the values of various parameters, including the parameters of 
world of utterance, time of utterance, and assignment of the context. If c is a 
context, I will call wc the world of utterance of c, uc the time of utterance of c, 
and gc the assignment of c. The assignment of a context assigns an element of D 
to every numerical index that occurs in the LF that is being interpreted. If the 
sentence whose LF we are interpreting is the first sentence of a discourse, the 
computation of its truth-condition starts at an index coordinate in which uc is 
both the perspective time and the time of evaluation. I will presuppose that the 
interpretation function ⟦ ⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t is computed using standard rules such as 
Functional Application, Predicate Abstraction, and Intensional Functional Appli-
cation. These rules are formulated in the appendix to this chapter.
Let me now make a few assumptions about the lexical meanings of English 
words. To begin with, I assume that proper names are context-insensitive rigid 
designators and that personal pronouns are context-sensitive rigid designators. 
The extension of a proper name is the individual that the name denotes. Every 
occurrence of a personal pronoun bears a numerical subscript. The extension of 
a personal pronoun is the object assigned to its numerical index by the current 
assignment (see the rule of Terminal Nodes in the appendix). If a pronoun is 
bound by a proper name, they must bear the same numerical index.
As I mentioned above, I assume that the extensions of verb phrases are of 
type <l, <e, t>>. The extensions of intransitive verbs are also of type <l, <e, t>>. 
Transitive verbs have extensions of type <e, <l, <e, t>>>. Below I provide the 
lexical entries of an activity verb, a stative verb, an accomplishment verb, and 
an achievement verb. The first verb is intransitive and the other three verbs are 
transitive.
Activity verb (run)
λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ De . e is an event of x running]
Stative verb (love)
λx ∈ De . [λe ∈ Dl .  [λy ∈ De . e is a state of y loving x]]
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7 It follows from this definition that the empty set is an assignment. A partial function from 
the set of natural numbers to D is a function from some subset of the set of natural numbers to 
D. When ∅ is the chosen subset of natural numbers, the resulting partial function is a subset 
of ∅ × D and it is easy to show that ∅ × D = ∅.
Accomplishment verb (build)
λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ De .  [λy ∈ De . e is an event of y building x]]
Achievement verb (recognize)
λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ Dl .  [λy ∈ De . e is an event of y recognizing x]]
Notice that these lexical entries do not specify the world and time in which the 
described eventualities take place. Nor do they give information about whether 
the eventuality is bounded (i.e. whether it has an initial and a final endpoint) or 
not.  On my account, the job of aspectual and tense features is to specify certain 
conditions that an eventuality has to satisfy in order to make an uttered sentence 
true. These conditions concern the location and the internal constitution of the 
eventuality.
I assume that there is a grammatical feature that distinguishes stative verbs 
from the other verb groups. While stative verbs bear the feature value [+stative], 
other verbs bear the value [−stative]. The values [±stative] are associated with 
different temporal behaviors. Expressions carrying the value [−stative] tend to 
move the action forward (or backward) in narrative discourse and never give rise 
to simultaneous readings. The eventualities that they describe are conceptualized 
as punctual. By contrast, expressions carrying the value [+stative] give rise to 
simultaneous readings and normally report what goes on at a given reference 
time without moving the narrative action backward or forward. They describe 
eventualities that we conceptualize as extended.
In Part 1 I adopted a Hintikka-style treatment of intensional verbs which take 
that-clause complements. Here I preserve the essentials of that treatment. By 
way of illustration, the lexical entries of the stative verb believe and the eventive 
verb say are given below. 
Lexical entry of believe
λp ∈ D<s, t> [λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ De . e is a state of x believing such that 
p (〈w’, t’〉) = 1, for every pair 〈w’, t’〉 ∈ W × T such that 〈w’, t’〉 is 
compatible with the content of e]]
Lexical entry of say
λp ∈ D<s, t> [λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ De . e is an event of x saying such that 
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p (〈w’, t’〉) = 1, for every pair 〈w’, t’〉 ∈ W × T such that 〈w’, t’〉 is 
compatible with the content of e]]
As Enç (1986) and other theorists have shown, common nouns that appear in de-
terminer phrases exhibit forms of temporal sensitivity that are independent of 
the tenses of verbs.8 I will not investigate here the context sensitivity of nouns. 
My account of tenses will not make predictions about the temporal interpretation 
of determiner phrases containing common nouns or adjectives. Nonetheless, I 
will assume that when a noun or an adjective is the complement of the verb be, 
the corresponding verb phrase has an extension of type <l, <e, t>> and describes 
a state. So, for example, the extension of the verb phrase be sick is the function 
λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ De . e is a state of x being sick]] and the extension of the verb 
phrase be king is the function λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ De . e is a state of x being king]]
4.2 A syntactic framework
Let us turn our attention to syntax. In this chapter I do not discuss sentences 
containing non-finite clauses. My discussion in the chapter will be focused on 
the interpretation of declarative finite clauses. The present section is devoted to 
introducing a framework for the syntactic representation of finite clauses. I will 
assume that the LFs of English finite clauses are binary and endocentric phrases 
which are subject to standard movement operations. Since some readers might 
not be sufficiently familiar with this kind of syntactic structures, in subsection 
4.2.1 I offer a brief overview of the syntactic literature on the structure of finite 
clauses. Those readers who are familiar with this literature can skip subsection 
4.2.1. In subsection 4.2.2 I present the main syntactic assumptions that I will 
make in this chapter.
Roughly speaking, a finite clause is a clause with subject-predicate structure 
whose syntactically highest verb form is finite. In English, finite verb forms can 
have nominative subjects and typically exhibit inflections associated with tense 
and agreement.9  Whereas non-finite clauses are always embedded under other 
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8 For some discussion of the temporal sensitivity  of nouns, see Enç 1981, 1986, Musan 1995, 
and Tonhauser 2002, 2006.
9 For a more detailed characterization of the distinction between finite and non-finite clauses, 
see e.g. Radford 1988, section 6.2.
clauses, finite clauses can occur embedded or unembedded. Let us briefly take a 
look at an unembedded finite clause. (1) is a sentence in the simple present with 
no embedded tenses. 
(1) John loves Mary
This sentence has three surface constituents: the finite verb form loves and the 
names John and Mary. The verb suffix -s is an indicator that the tense associated 
with (1) is the present tense. In English, this suffix surfaces only when a verb 
form is in the third person singular and has present tense. In other grammatical 
environments, the present form of an English verb is simply its base form. The 
past forms of English regular verbs exhibit an overt indicator of the past tense, 
namely the suffix -(e)d. But the past forms of many irregular verbs lack an overt 
affix associated with the past tense. Linguists commonly assume that any finite 
verb form of English has a tense, regardless of whether that form exhibits or not 
an overt tense affix. One way of implementing this idea in a theory of syntax is 
to hold that at the LF-level the tense of a finite verb form is specified by a tense 
morpheme which may not be visible at the surface level. Since English employs 
periphrasis rather than inflection to deal with futurity, it is commonly assumed 
that English has two tense morphemes. I will call them past and pres. If pres is a 
functional constituent of (1)’s LF-structure, the question arises as to where pres 
is located at LF and how it is syntactically related to the verb love. Different an-
swers to this question have been proposed throughout the history of generative 
grammar. In subsection 4.2.1 I briefly describe some of the developments which 
led generative linguists to propose the syntactic treatment of finite clauses that I 
will adopt here.10  Due to space limitations, I will not talk about the empirical 
observations which motivated these theoretical developments. Though I will not 
reconstruct any syntactic theory in much detail, the interested reader will find 
references to the relevant literature in my overview.
4.2.1 The syntax of tense morphemes in generative grammar
Chomsky’s (1957) seminal theory of the auxiliary system of English provided a 
transformational account of inflectional verb affixation. The theory hypothesized 
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10 See Stowell 2012 and Lasnik & Lohndal 2013 for more detailed surveys of these theoretical 
developments.
that the inflectional affixes of English verbs originated in pre-verbal syntactic 
positions and were moved to the post-verbal positions that we observe in surface 
syntax by means of a transformational rule. The syntactic rule responsible for 
this transformation came to be known as ‘Affix Hopping’. On the so-called 
‘Standard Theory’ of generative grammar (Chomsky 1965), sentence (1) had a 
deep structure along the lines of (2).
(2)
Affix Hopping acted upon deep structures of this sort and transformed them into 
representations exhibiting post-verbal affixes. The diagram below represents the 
result of applying Affix Hopping to (2).
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(3)
With the advent of Government & Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981), a syntactic 
element called ‘INFL’ was postulated at the LF-level. INFL’s job was to indicate 
whether a clause was finite or infinitival and to specify the agreement properties 
of finite clauses. Chomsky assumed that complement clauses and non-embedded 
clauses had LF-structures of the following form:
(4)
On this proposal, the two immediate constituent of a complement clause such as 
that John loves Mary (whose syntactic category was S’) were a complementizer 
(e.g. that) and a propositional component (i.e. a clause of category S). NP, INFL, 
and VP were the immediate constituents of the propositional component. INFL 
had the value [+tense] when it appeared in a finite clause and had the value 
[−tense] when it appeared in an infinitival clause. In finite clauses, INFL also 
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carried values for the agreement features of person, number, and gender.
The view that complement clauses had the syntactic structure depicted in (4) 
was quickly abandoned. An important step in the development of Government & 
Binding Theory was the extension of X-bar Theory to the syntactic categories S 
and S’. X-bar Theory had been originally invoked to analyze the structure of 
English phrases headed by nouns, verbs, and adjectives (see Chomsky 1970). 
During the seventies and early eighties, the theory was extended to phrases of 
other categories and it eventually became a general theory of phrase structure. 
The principles of X-bar Theory generate syntactic structures of the following 
form:
(5)
In this schema, X stands for the syntactic category of the head of a phrase. XP is 
the maximal projection of the head and X’ is its intermediate projection.11 While 
the specifier of the head (Spec) is a daughter of XP and a sister of X’, the head’s 
complement (Comp) is a daughter X’.12 (For simplicity, non-branching interme-
diate projections will be sometimes omitted in my phrase structure trees). The 
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11  X-bar Theory  was so-called because the projections XP and X’ were originally  labeled 
using overbars. I employ  here the notation of Chomsky 1986 and later works. Accessible in-
troductions to X-bar Theory can be found in Radford 1988, chapters 4-5, Newson 2006, chap-
ter 3, section 1, and Santorini & Kroch 2007, chapters 4-5.
12 In English, complements typically  follow the head and specifiers typically precede it. Con-
sider, for instance, the noun phrase the author of that book. According to X-bar Theory, this 
phrase has the structure [NP [Det the] [N’ [N author] [PP of that book]]]. Here author is the head, 
the is the specifier, and of that book is the complement. Of course, there are phrases which do 
not exhibit overt specifiers and complements. Some X-bar theorists assume that every phrase 
has the form [XP Spec [X’ [X head] Comp]] and that the terminal nodes of the specifier and 
complement positions may be empty. Others assume that phrases can have alternative forms 
such as [XP  [X’ [X head]]], [XP Spec [X’ [X head]]], or [XP [X’ [X head] Comp]]. I will adopt the 
latter view in the present chapter.
X-bar Theory schema (5) is instantiated by structures that are binary-branching 
and endocentric (i.e. have a syntactic head). By contrast, some of the structures 
proposed in Chomsky 1981 and earlier works were exocentric (lacked a head) 
and had three or more branches.
In order to apply the X-Bar Theory schema to the internal structure of phrases 
of category S, Stowell (1981, chapter 2) –drawing on Chomsky 1981, chapter 5– 
proposed an analysis of S-structure where INFL was the head of S, VP was the 
complement of INFL, and NP was its specifier. He also proposed an analysis of 
S’ structure where COMP (the complementizer) was the heads of S’ (see Stowell 
1981, chapter 6). The old categories S’ and S were then relabeled in conformity 
with the X-Bar Theory schema. Phrases of category S’ became complementizer 
phrases (CPs) headed by a complementizer and phrases of category S became 
inflection phrases (IPs) headed by an inflectional element. (6) and (7) represent 
the basic structures of CPs and IPs.
(6)
(7)
Pollock (1989) proposed to split IP structures into a tense phrase (TP) headed by 
a tense morpheme and an agreement phrase (AgrP) carrying agreement features. 
Although Pollock’s postulation of an AgrP at the LF-level was later rejected, the 
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assumption that the LFs of finite clauses are TPs has been widely adopted in the 
syntactic literature. In the last two decades, syntacticians have proposed to split 
CPs, TPs, and VPs in different ways. I will not review these proposals here.13 
For the purposes of this chapter, it suffices to mention that some analyses of the 
structure of TPs posit an aspect phrase (AspP) between TP and VP. This is an 
assumption that I adopt in the next subsection.
4.2.2 Syntactic assumptions
I am now in position to introduce the main assumptions that I will make in this 
chapter regarding the syntax of finite clauses in English.
To begin with, I will assume that the LF-structures of English finite clauses 
conform to the structural constraints of X-bar Theory. More specifically, I will 
assume that the LFs of such clauses are either tense phrases (TPs) or modal 
phrases (MPs) with X-bar style internal structures. If the highest verb of a finite 
clause is a lexical verb or a non-modal auxiliary, the clause is represented as a 
TP headed by pres or past. If the highest verb of the clause is a modal auxiliary, 
the clause is represented as a MP headed by the corresponding modal. 
My account of tenses posits a tense feature with values [±past]. By default, 
pres carries the value [−past] and past carries the value [+past].
I will also assume that an aspect phrase (AspP) is always projected above the 
VP of a finite clause. The head of an AspP carries the features [±perfective] and 
[±episodic].14  Auxiliary phrases (AuxPs) and negation phrases (NegPs) can be 
optionally projected between a VP and a TP/MP. Agreement phrases (AgrPs) 
will not be represented in our LFs. Finally, I will assume that a determiner 
phrase (DPs) in object position can be moved out of its associated VP, thereby 
giving rise to wide scope readings. This movement operation is the result of ap-
plying the rule of quantifying raising.
Given the previous syntactic assumptions, (8) is the LF of (1).
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13 For an overview of split theories, see Radford 2009, chapter 8.
14 Asp heads may also carry the feature [±perfect]. But I omit this feature because perfects are 
not discussed in this chapter.
(8)
I will not adopt here the so-called ‘VP-internal subject hypothesis’. According to 
this hypothesis, subject NPs and subject DPs originate as the specifiers of VPs. 
They are obligatorily moved out of their original positions to become the speci-
fiers of TPs/MPs. If we adopted the VP-internal subject hypothesis, we could 
analyze tenses as having denotations of type <<s, t>, t>. Denotations of this type 
are functions from propositions to truth-values. Instead, we are going to analyze 
tenses as having denotations of type <<s, <e, t>>, <e, t>>. On this account, the 
job of tenses is to map properties of individuals to functions from individuals to 
truth-values.
4.3 Embedded occurrences of past
We have now a semantic framework and a stock of syntactic assumptions that 
will allow us to specify possible interpretations for the English tenses and obtain 
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truth-conditional predictions. As I mentioned above, I am going to assume that 
the denotations of the English tenses are functions of type <<s, <e, t>>, <e, t>>.
Which functions of this semantic type do pres, past, and will denote? First of all, 
it is important to keep in mind that our intensional framework is quite flexible. 
There are various possible ways of interpreting the simple tenses of English that 
are compatible with this framework. In this section I consider three strategies for 
interpreting the simple tenses of English. The first two strategies analyze these 
tenses as absolute or relative. The third strategy makes tenses sensitive to the 
perspective time and assumes that perspective times can be switched in some 
syntactic environments. I argue that this strategy overcomes the shortcomings of 
the other two strategies.
I begin by discussing the behavior of past in relative and complement clauses. 
As it is well known, in languages like English embedded stative predicates give 
rise to simultaneous readings in past-under-past environments. Simultaneous 
readings will be considered in section 4.4. In this subsection I focus my attention 
on cases where embedded past carries a meaning of temporal anteriority. The 
examples that I consider in this section involve eventive embedded predicates.
In the literature on embedded tense, it is usual to distinguish between absolute 
and relative accounts of tenses.15  Roughly, an account of past as an absolute 
tense attributes to past the lexical meaning TE (time of eventuality) ＜ TU (time 
of utterance). This type of account assumes that past is by default anchored to 
the time of utterance of a sentence. As we will see shortly, there are types of em-
bedded clauses in which past intuitively does not mean TE ＜ TU.16 An account 
of past as a relative tense attributes to past the lexical meaning TE (time of 
eventuality) ＜ LTE (local time of evaluation). The local time of evaluation of 
an embedded occurrence of past is the time of evaluation that it inherits from the 
clause in which it is embedded. In the cases that we are going to consider here, a 
relative account predicts that an embedded past is anchored to the time of the 
matrix eventuality. However, there are types of embedded clauses in which past 
is not intuitively interpreted as meaning TEE (time of eventuality of the embed-
ded clause) ＜ TME (time of the matrix eventuality). The challenge for relative 
accounts of past is to find principles that allow us to predict the right readings in 
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15 The distinction is based on Comrie’s (1985) analysis of absolute and relative tenses.
16 For a succinct discussion of the problems of absolute and relative theories of tenses, see 
Gennari 2003, pp. 35-43. Absolute theories are criticized in von Stechow 1995, pp. 363-366, 
Ogihara 1996, pp. 181-187, Abusch 1997, and Kusumoto 1999, pp. 20-22 and 30-31.
these problematic cases without abandoning the assumption that the meaning of 
past is TE ＜ LTE. The distinction between absolute and relative accounts can 
also be drawn with respect to other tenses. There are, for example, absolute and 
relative accounts of pres as well as absolute and relative accounts of will. Each 
family of theories has to deal with problematic uses of the relevant tenses which 
do not seem to conform to the basic meaning attributed to the tense.
In section 4.1 I characterized the notion of perspective time and I disguised it 
from other roles which times can play in temporal discourse. Now I want to put 
forward the hypothesis that the lexical meaning of past is TE ＜ PT (perspective 
time). In other words, past imposes the condition that the time of eventuality 
must precede the temporal point of view from which the eventuality is seen. 
For any assignment g, context c, world w, and times Rt, Pt, and t,
(9) Lexical entry of past
⟦past [+past]⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that 
t’ ＜ Pt, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
In order to make predictions about the interpretation of an embedded occurrence 
of past, we need lexical entries for the other tenses. I will provisionally assume 
that PT ⊆ TE is the lexical meaning of pres and that PT ＜ TE is the lexical 
meaning of will. Here are the lexical entries of pres and will:
For any assignment g, context c, world w, and times Rt, Pt, and t,
(10) Lexical entry of pres
⟦pres [−past]⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that 
Pt ⊆ t’, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
(11) Lexical entry of will
⟦will⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that 
Pt ＜ t’, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
Aspectual features turn functions of semantic type <l, <e, t>> into functions of 
type <e, t>. AspPs are of type <<l, <e, t>>, <e, t>>. Rules (12)-(14) specify the 
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interpretations of the values [±perfective] and [+episodic]. I will assume that 
[±perfective] values are computed before [±episodic] values. 
For any node α, assignment g, context c, world w, and times Rt, Pt, and t,
(12) Perfective aspect
⟦α [+perfective]⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λu ∈ D<l, <e, t>> . [λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ D . e is bounded 
and u (e) (x) = 1]]
(13) Imperfective aspect
⟦α [−perfective]⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λu ∈ D<l, <e, t>> . [λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ D . e is open 
and u (e) (x) = 1]]
(14) Episodic aspect
⟦α [+episodic]⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λu ∈ D<l, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . there is an eventuality e 
such that u (e) (x) = 1]
According to rules (12)-(14), the perfective aspect characterizes the eventuality 
described by a given VP as a bounded (or completed) eventuality –that is to say, 
as an eventuality that has both an initial and a final endpoint. The imperfective 
aspect characterizes it as an open eventuality in the sense that it may or may not 
have endpoints. Rules (12)-(14) are based on Smith’s (1997) analysis of English 
aspect. The episodic aspect introduces an existential quantifier which saturates 
the eventuality argument, thereby yielding a function of type <e, t>. 
Let us apply the rules (9)-(11) to some examples. I will focus my attention on 
examples involving embedded occurrences of past.
According to my account, the time of utterance is, by default, the perspective 
time with respect to which tenses are interpreted. But the perspective time can 
be shifted when appropriate triggers are present in the structure of the sentence. 
Extensional verbs are not perspective shifters. Intensional verbs, by contrast, 
trigger a perspective shift. This explains the contrast between (15) and (16).17
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17 (16) is an example of Ogihara (1996, p. 169).
(I call TEE the time of eventuality of the embedded clause and TME the time 
of eventuality of the matrix clause. TU is the time of utterance.)
(15) John met a person who saw Schindler’s List
Unique reading: TME ＜ TU & TEE ＜ TU
(16) John sought a person who saw Schindler’s List
de re reading: TME ＜ TU & TEE ＜ TU
de dicto reading: TEE ＜ TME ＜ TU
Relative theories of past predict that (15) has a reading of type TEE ＜ TME. 
On this (alleged) reading of (15), the event of seeing Schindler’s List is anterior 
to the event of meeting the relevant person. Since it is clear that (15) can be true 
in a scenario in which John met the person before the time in which the person 
saw Schindler’s List, relative theorists must explain how a reading compatible 
with this scenario is possible.18  I claim that (15) has only one reading, even 
though this reading is compatible with different scenarios that make (15) true. 
The unique reading of (15) is TME ＜ TU & TEE ＜ TU. This is a reading in 
which the two events are characterized a past events (prior to TU) but no relative 
order between them is imposed. My account predicts this reading for sentences 
like (15). Since there are no perspective-shift triggers in (15), the perspective 
time of both the matrix past and the embedded past of (16) is the time of utter-
ance. So, when lexical entry (9) is applied, the two occurrences of past of (15) 
take us to a time anterior to TU.
Suppose now that in (16) the intensional verb seek switches the perspective 
time of its grammatical object. Specifically, suppose that seek  turns TME –the 
time of seeking in the case of (16)– into the perspective time of the relative 
clause. When we apply lexical entry (9) to the embedded past of (16), TEE –the 
time of seeing Schindler’s List– is located before the current perspective time, 
which by assumption is TME. As a result, we obtain the de dicto reading of (16), 
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18  In order to get the reading in which the two event times are independent, some relative 
theorists invoke the rule of quantifier raising (see Ogihara 1996, chapter 5 and Stowell 2007). 
But Kusumoto (2005, section 2.2) shows that this strategy does not  work when more complex 
relative clauses with past-under-past structure are considered.
which is the reading on which the predicate person who saw Schindler’s List 
characterizes the content of John’s seeking action. Under this reading, John was 
seeking a person who had seen Schindler’s List before John’s present. The 
worlds compatible with the content of John’s seeking action are worlds in which 
John finds a person who saw Schindler’s List before John’s seeking.
(16) has also a de re reading. On this reading, the predicate person who saw 
Schindler’s List simply describes the person that John was seeking and it is not 
assumed that John was thinking about this person under the description given by 
the predicate. The standard way of accounting for de re readings in sentences 
with relative clauses is to assume that the rule of quantifier raising acts on the 
LFs of such sentences before the interpretation. I will endorse this explanation 
of the de re reading of (16). By virtue of the quantifier-raising rule, the objet DP 
a person who saw Schindler’s List is moved out of the scope of the matrix past. 
The result of this operation is LF (17).
(17)
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Since in (17) the object DP has been moved out of the scope of the verb seek, 
this verb does not shift the perspective time of the past morpheme of that DP.19 
(17) thus receives an interpretation where TEE is prior to TU but not necessarily 
precedes TME.
The view that intensional verbs are perspective-time shifters also allows us to 
explain why sentences like (18) have only a backward-shifted reading.
(18) John said that Bill lost his wallet
backward-shifted reading: TEE ＜ TME ＜ TU
Sentence (18) lacks a reading where TEE is anterior to TU but posterior to TME. 
Explaining why this reading is absent is a crucial challenge for absolute theories 
of past. The embedded clause of (18) is a complement clause. I assume that in 
clauses of this kind, the embedded tense is always under scope of the matrix 
verb. The complement clause of (18) cannot be moved out of the scope of the 
verb say. Consequently, this verb obligatorily triggers a perspective switch that 
makes TME –the time of saying– the perspective time of the complement 
clause. When (9) is applied to the past of the complement clause, this clause is 
interpreted as describing an event of loosing a wallet which happens before the 
time of John’s saying (TEE). Thus, (18) only has a backward-shifted reading.
In brief, if we adopt some reasonable syntactic assumptions, the account of 
past that I have proposed here explains the behavior of past in past-under-past 
complement and relative clauses with eventive verbs. In a sentence like (15), the 
embedded past seems to behave as an absolute tense. The eventuality described 
by the relative clause precedes the time of utterance but it does not necessarily 
precede the time of the matrix eventuality. In sentences like (16) and (18), the 
embedded past seems to behave as a relative tense. (16) and (18) have readings 
in which the time of eventuality of the embedded clause is anterior to the time of 
the matrix eventuality. If we assume that past means TE ＜ PT, the hypothesis 
that intensional verbs switch the perspective time explains this crucial difference 
between sentences like (15) and sentences like (16) and (18).
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19 Kusumoto (2005, pp. 330-331) acknowledges that QR-movement can account for de re / de 
dicto readings in cases like (16), even though QR-movement fails as an explanation of the 
truth-conditions of sentences like (15).
One problem for absolute theories of past that has been documented in the lit-
erature is that the English past can have backwards-shifted interpretations when 
it is embedded under will. Below I provide four examples borrowed from the 
literature.20
(19) Bill will tell you that Mary’s exam went well
(20) No matter what you give him to eat, he will eat it and tell you that 
he liked it
(21) Sue will marry a man she met recently
(22) We will answer every letter that we got
It has been observed that not all English speakers like these sentences. For some 
English speakers, however, these sentences have a backwards-shifted reading of 
type TU ＜ TME & TEE ＜ TME and not only a reading of type TU ＜ TME & 
TEE ＜ TU. It is generally agreed in the literature that the existence of the first 
type of reading (for some speakers) must be explained somehow. As it turns 
turns out, my account of past predicts the backwards-shifted reading of (19) and 
(20). The matrix verbs of these two sentences are intensional verbs. Thus, they 
make TME the time of evaluation of the embedded clause. The application of 
lexical entry (9) to the embedded clause has the effect of imposing the condition 
that TEE ＜ TME, but the condition that TEE ＜ TU is not imposed. This is a 
nice result. However, my account does not predict a reading of type TU ＜ TME 
& TEE ＜ TU for (19) and (20). Accounting for this kind of reading is important 
because it is the most salient one (or the only one) for some speakers. In fact, I 
suspect that the peculiarity of sentences (19)-(22) stems from the fact that the 
two readings compete with each other to be processed.
Let me propose a modification of my account of past. Let us suppose that 
English has two tense features, which I will call [±past] and [±past i] (the i 
stands for indexical). The feature value [+past] is interpreted as in (9), but we 
will not think of (9) anymore as the lexical entry of past. (9) simply specifies the 
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20 See Abusch 1997, p. 37, Kratzer 1998, p. 16, Kusumoto 1999, p. 22, and Gennari 2003, p. 
55.
interpretation of [+past]. The feature value [+past i] is interpreted as meaning 
TE (time of eventuality) ＜ TU. (23) is the interpretation rule of [+past i].
For any assignment g, context c, world w, and times Rt, Pt, and t,
(23) Rule for [+past i]
⟦past [+past]⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that 
t’ ＜ uc, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
[+past i] imposes the condition that the time of eventuality must precede the 
time of utterance. Suppose that past carries by default the two feature values 
[+past] and [+past i]. The intuitive idea is that the semantic contribution of past 
consists in relating the time of eventuality to two possibly different times: the 
time of utterance and the perspective time. When the perspective time is identi-
cal to the time of utterance, past simply imposes the condition that TE ＜ TU. 
But in an intensional environment –where the perspective time is different from 
the time of utterance– past imposes the condition that TE ＜ TU & TE ＜ PT. 
That is to say, past locates the time of eventuality before the time of utterance 
and before the present of the agent of an attitude report or a speech act report. 
This hypothesis does not affect my account of past-under-past sentences such as 
(16) and (18). But it predicts that (19) and (20) have the non-backwards-shifted 
reading TU ＜ TME & TEE ＜ TU. For the feature value [+past i] of past im-
poses the condition that TEE ＜ TU. 
To obtain the backwards-shifted reading of (19)-(20) in our new account, let 
us assume that will optionally deletes the feature value [+past i] of past. When 
will deletes the value of [+past i] of a past tense under its scope, past [+past] [+past i] 
becomes past [+past] and the clause embedded under will is interpreted using only 
the condition that [+past] carries, namely the condition that TP ＜ TE. Since in 
the context of an intensional verb clause TP = TME and TE = TEE, this amounts 
to saying that past [+past] imposes the condition that TEE ＜ TME, which is the 
condition that generates the backwards-shifted reading of (19)-(20).
We do not have yet an account of the backwards-shifted reading of (21) and 
(22). Since these sentences do not have an intensional verb, the perspective time 
of their embedded clauses is the time of utterance. Therefore, past [+past] [+past i] 
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has the same interpretation as past [+past] in the relative clauses of (21) and (22). 
The deletion operation of will has no semantic effect. To fix this problem, let us 
assume that will is also a trigger of perspective-time switch. Will turns the future 
time that it introduces into the perspective time of its embedded clause. Thus, 
the perspective time of the relative clauses of (21) and (22) is TME –the time of 
marrying and the time of answering the letter. When will deletes the feature 
value [+past i] from past [+past] [+past i] in the embedded clauses of (21) and (22), 
past [+past] imposes the condition that TEE ＜ TME, thereby yielding the 
backwards-shifted reading of (21) and (22). When will does not delete [+past i] 
from past [+past] [+past i] in the embedded clauses of (21) and (22), past [+past] [+past i] 
imposes the condition that TEE ＜ TU –and also the condition that TEE ＜ 
TME, but this condition is entailed by the first one given that in (21) and (22) 
TU ＜ TME. So, the non-application of [+past i] deletion by will gives rise to 
the non-backwards-shifted reading of (21) and (22).
(The fact that (19) and (20) contain two triggers of perspective-time switches 
is not problematic. The two switch operations have the result that TME is the 
perspective time of the complement clauses of (19)-(20).)
The modified account that I have proposed predicts the readings of all the 
sentences that we have considered so far. The reader might feel that I have made 
too many assumptions in order to get the right readings. But let me point out that 
the empirical consequences of the account are quite interesting.
The account can be extended to pres. Suppose that pres carries by default the 
two feature values [−past] and [−past i], where [−past] introduces the condition 
that PT ⊆ TE and [−past i] introduces the condition that TU ⊆ TE.
Consider now sentence (24).
(24) John saw a man who is crying
Since (22) does not have elements that trigger a perspective-time switch, the 
perspective time of the relative clause of (24) is the utterance time. Thus, (24) 
has a reading in which the time of utterance must be included in the interval of 
time in which the man is crying (TU ⊆ TEE), but the time of seeing (TME) does 
not need to be included in the time of the crying.
By contrast, (25) and (26) have intensional verbs that switch the perspective 
time.
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(25) John looked for a student who understands the incompleteness theorem
(26) John said that Mary is pregnant
The intensional verbs of (25) and (26) make TME the perspective time of the 
embedded clauses. The feature value [−past] of pres [−past] [−past i] imposes the 
condition that TME ⊆ TEE, while the feature value [−past i] imposes the condi-
tion that TU ⊆ TEE. As a result, the eventuality described by the embedded 
clause is represented as an eventuality that extends from TME to TU (in the 
worlds compatible with what John looked for/said). Hence, my account predicts 
the so-called double-access readings of sentences (25) and (26).21
Sentences (27) and (28) are ambiguous.
(27) I will use an iron that is hot
(28) Gianni will say (next week) that Maria is dancing well
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21 I believe that the accounts of double-access sentences that have been proposed in the litera-
ture (or at least  the ones I am familiar with) are not satisfactory. Abusch (1991, 1994, 1997) 
and Ogihara (1995a, 1996, 1999) proposed de re analyses of double-access readings. Gennari 
(1999, pp. 95-97, 2003, pp. 42-43) has persuasively argued that such de re analyses are inade-
quate because they impose requirements on the res of a double-access sentence that do not 
need to be satisfied in every  scenario in which that  sentence is felicitously uttered. The 
accounts of double-access sentences of authors such as Enç (1987), Stowell (1995, 2007), and 
Higginbotham (2002) lack an explicit semantics for intensional verbs. For this reason, it is 
hard to judge whether those accounts predict the right truth-conditions for double-access sen-
tences. The accounts proposed by  Gennari (1999, 2003) and by  Altshuler and Schwarzschild 
(2013) characterize the English present as combining a relative requirement –that the descri-
bed state of affairs overlaps with the local evaluation time– and a deictic requirement –that 
the described state of affairs is not wholly located before the speech time. These accounts 
predict that the sentence John said that Mary is pregnant is true just in case all the worlds 
compatible with what John says at some past time are worlds where Mary  is pregnant at the 
time of John’s saying and is still pregnant at the time of utterance. This is not the right truth-
condition for the sentence. If a week ago John asserted the sentence Mary is pregnant, then 
the sentence John said that Mary is pregnant is true today. However, there are worlds compa-
tible with what John said in which Mary’s pregnancy  is interrupted at some point between the 
time of John’s saying and the present day. Thus, the accounts of double-access sentences of 
Gennari and Altshuler and Schwarzschild predict that John said that Mary is pregnant is false 
today. My account makes the same erroneous prediction. To avoid this problem, the relevant 
set of compatible worlds must be restricted in an appropriate manner.
(27) and (28) have a reading of type TU ＜ TME & TME ⊆ TEE (in which the 
eventuality of the embedded clause occurs in the future). But they also have a 
reading of type TU ＜ TME & TME ⊆ TEE & TU ⊆ TEE (in which the 
embedded-clause eventuality extends from the present to the future time of the 
matrix clause). I suggest that the optional rule of deletion of [+past i] by will 
discussed earlier is a rule that also acts on [−past i]. When this rule is applied to 
delete [−past i], pres [−past] [−past i] becomes pres [−past] and the embedded clause is 
interpreted as TME ⊆ TEE. When the rule is not applied, the embedded clause is 
interpreted as TME ⊆ TEE & TU ⊆ TEE.
[−past i] deletion can be found in other present-under-modal constructions.
(29) John should talk to whoever is guarding the entrance
(30) Mary may say that she is in charge
(29) and (30) also have a reading of type TU ＜ TME & TME ⊆ TEE and a 
reading of type TU ＜ TME & TME ⊆ TEE & TU ⊆ TEE. If we assume that 
modals like should and may share with will the property of being triggers of 
perspective-time shifts and of optional [−past i] deletion, we can account for 
both readings of (29) and (30) using the same basic principles that we applied to 
account for (27)-(28) and (19)-(22).
We can apply part of the modified account of this section to the analysis of 
will. will can be analyzed as a tense that also establishes a relation between the 
time of evaluation, the time of utterance, and the perspective time. In particular, 
we can analyze will as meaning TU ＜ TE & TP ＜ TE.
(31) Modified lexical entry of will
⟦will⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that Pt ＜ t’ 
and uc ＜ t’, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
The principle of feature deletion cannot be applied to embedded occurrences of 
will because will always introduces a time of evaluation that is posterior to the 
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time of utterance. But lexical entry (31) is useful for explaining the behavior of 
will in sentences like (32) and (33).
(32) In two days, an official will announce that the president will apologize
(33) Two days ago, an official announced that the president will apologize
The complement clause of (32) is interpreted in such a way that the apology 
event is posterior to the announcement event. On my account, this reading arises 
because the matrix will switches the perspective time and the embedded will 
takes the new perspective time –the time of the announcement– and shifts it to a 
time posterior to it. will shifts the perspective time in this way because one com-
ponent of its meaning is TP ＜ TE. In (33), the complement clause describes an 
event that is posterior to the time of utterance, despite the fact that the embedded 
will is under the scope of a perspective-switching verb. This reading is predicted 
in my account because the other component of the meaning of will is TU ＜ TE. 
Without one of the two components, we would fail to account of one these two 
sentences. Therefore, the two components are necessary in order to explain the 
behavior of will in complement clauses.22
4.4 Simultaneous readings
Sentence (34), like many other English sentences with stative complements, is 
ambiguous.
(34) John heard that Mary was pregnant
(34) has a reading in which the content of John’s act of hearing represents Mary 
as being pregnant at the time of the hearing. This is the simultaneous reading of 
(34), which is the reading in which (34) is true if John heard someone uttering 
the sentence Mary is pregnant. (34) also has a reading in which the content of 
John’s hearing represents Mary as being pregnant before the time of the hearing. 
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22 My examples of embedded pres and embedded will were also borrowed from the literature. 
See Heim 1994, p. 158, Enç 1987, p. 647, Enç 1997, p. 6, Ogihara 1996, p. 97, Higginbotham 
2002, p. 225, and Gennari 2003, p. 37.
This is the so-called shifted reading of (34). On this reading, (34) is true if John 
heard someone asserting the sentence Mary was pregnant.
(35) is an example of a sentence with a relative clause that has also a simulta-
neous reading.
(35) John saw a man who was crying
There is a reading of (35) in which the time of seeing and the time of crying 
overlap. 
The morpheme past can receive a simultaneous interpretation even in cases in 
which the time of eventuality of the matrix clause lies to the future of the time of 
utterance.23 (36) is an example due to Abusch (1988) that has been widely cited 
in the literature.
(36) John decided a week ago that in ten days at breakfast he will say to his 
mother that they were having their last meal together
The embedded predicate were having their last meal together intuitively refers 
to an event that is simultaneous with the saying event. The meal event cannot be 
anterior to the time of utterance. In fact, no event posterior to the meal event is 
mentioned in (35). 
The account of embedded tenses proposed in the previous section predicts the 
shifted reading of (34). Since hear is an intensional verb, the perspective time of 
the complement clause of (34) is the time of John’s hearing. The complement 
past of (34), which carries the feature value [+past], shifts the time of time of 
John’s hearing to a time anterior to it. As a consequence, the worlds compatible 
with John’s hearing are represented as worlds where Mary is pregnant before the 
time of the hearing. The shifted reading of (34) is thus predicted. 
However, the account of section 4.3 does not predict the simultaneous reading 
of sentences like (34)-(36). I believe that the account of tenses developed in this 
chapter is compatible with different accounts of simultaneous readings that have 
been proposed in the literature. A pragmatic-oriented account of these readings 
along the lines of Gennari’s (2003) theory, for example, is compatible with the 
account of the previous section. The sequence-of-tense rule of Ogihara (1996) is 
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23 See e.g. Abusch 1988, pp. 2-3, Heim 1994, pp. 159, and Ogihara 1995, pp. 676-678, 1996, 
pp. 6-9, 91-93.
compatible with it as well. For concreteness, I adopt here a variant of Ogihara’s 
rule. Here is a formulation of the sequence-of-tense rule for English based on 
the framework of this chapter.
SOT rule
If an occurrence α of past is c-commanded by another occurrence of past, the 
two feature values [+past] and [+past i] of α can be optionally deleted.
This rules accounts for the simultaneous readings of (34)-(35). In the three cases 
the past of the matrix clause c-commands the past of the embedded clause. SOT 
deletes the values [+past] and [+past i] of the embedded past. In the type of in-
tensional framework that we have employed in this chapter, a featureless past 
simply transmits to its VP the time of evaluation that it receives from the past 
that c-commands it. So, Mary’s pregnancy is interpreted in (34) as obtaining at 
the time of John’s hearing. Similarly, in (35) the crying event interpreted as ob-
taining at the time of John’s seeing and in (35) the meal is interpreted as taking 
place at the time of the saying event. Thus, SOT yields the right truth-conditions 
for sentences (34)-(36).
One problem of Ogihara’s sequence-of-tense-rule approach is that SOT does 
not explain why eventive embedded clauses do not have simultaneous readings. 
SOT is a structural rule that applies to sentences with eventive and stative 
clauses. But the application of the rule to eventive embedded clauses with past 
tense has no observable semantic effects. Although this problem suggests that 
SOT does not tell us the whole story about the genesis of simultaneous readings, 
I will end my discussion here. In this section I just wanted to suggest that the ac-
count of embedded tenses given in 4.3 is compatible with Ogihara’s sequence-
of-tense approach. 
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Appendix to chapter 4
Semantic types and domains
The semantic framework of chapter 4 uses a typed system of semantic domains. 
The basic types of this systems are e (the type of individuals), t (the type of 
truth-values), l (the type of eventualities), and s (the type of world/time pairs).
Semantic types are recursively defined by the following rules:
• e, t, s, and l are semantic types
• If σ and τ are semantic types, then <σ, τ> is a semantic type
• Nothing else is a semantic type
Let W be the set of all possible worlds. Let M be the set of all moments. Let us 
call D the set of all individuals that inhabit worlds/moments. If we assume that 
individuals exist at world/moment coordinates, D can be defined in terms of W 
and M in the following way:
D := {x: there is some w ∈ W and there is some m ∈ M such that x 
exists in w at m}
Similarly, if we assume that eventualities hold (or ‘go on’) at worlds/moments, 
the set of possible eventualities (let us call it E) can be defined in the following 
way: 
E := {e: there is some w ∈ W and there is some time m ∈ M such 
that e holds in w at m}
Let < be the relation of temporal precedence between moments. A subset t of M 
is a time –i.e. a time interval– just in case, for any moments m, m’ ∈ t, if there is 
some moment m’’ such that m < m’’ < m’, then m’’ ∈ t. Let T be the set of all 
times. Finally, let us assume that 1 and 0 are, respectively, the truth-values truth 
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and falsity. 
Semantic types are in one-to-one correspondence with semantic domains. The 
class of semantic domains is recursively defined as follows:
• De = D, Dt = {1, 0}, Dl = E, and Ds = W × T
• If σ and τ are semantic types, then D<σ, τ> is the set of all functions 
from Dσ to Dτ
Relations between times
Different relations between times can be defined in terms of the moments that 
they contain. For any times t and t’, 
Temporal precedence
t ＜ t’ iff, for every m ∈ t and every m’ ∈ t’, m < m’
Temporal inclusion
t ⊆ t’ iff, for every m ∈ t, m ∈ t’
Overlap
t O t’ iff there is some m ∈ M such that m ∈ t and m ∈ t’
Interpretation rules
Some interpretation rules are required in order to compute the truth-conditions 
of the English sentences discussed in chapter 4. Here I state the main rules that 
were presupposed throughout the chapter. 
Recall that an assignment is a partial and injective function from the set of 
natural numbers to D. If g is an assignment, let us call dom(g) the domain of g.
For any assignment g, context c, world w, times Rt, Pt, and t, and numerical 
index i,
Functional application (FA)
If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ such that β’s 
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denotation is of type <σ, τ> and γ’s denotation is of type σ, 
then ⟦α⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = ⟦β⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t (⟦γ⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t)
Intensional functional application (IFA)
If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ such that β’s 
denotation is of type <s, σ> and γ’s denotation is of type σ, 
then ⟦α⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = ⟦β⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t (λ〈w’, t’〉 . ⟦γ⟧g, c, w’, Rt, Pt, t’)
Predicate abstraction (PA)
If α is a branching node with daughters i and β, 
then ⟦α⟧g, c, w’, Rt, Pt, t’ =  λx . ⟦β⟧g[x/i], c, w’, Rt, Pt, t’
Non-branching nodes (NN)
If α is a non-branching node and β is its daughter, 
then ⟦α⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = ⟦β⟧ g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t
Terminal nodes (TN)
• If α is a terminal node occupied by a lexical item, 
then ⟦α⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t is specified in the lexicon.
• If αi is a terminal node, α is a pronoun or a trace, and i ∈ dom(g), 
then ⟦αi⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t = g(i).
• If α is a terminal node occupied by a non-indexed pronoun, 
then ⟦αi⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t is an element of D determined by c
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Two Derivations
Consider sentence (1) (which is similar to sentence (28) of chapter 4).
(1) Gianni will say that Maria is writing a book
In order to illustrate how the formal apparatus of chapter 4 works, here I will 
provide truth-condition derivations of the two readings of (1).
Let c be the context in which (1) is uttered. The two readings of (1) can be 
specified as follows:
First reading of (1)
For some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e such that e 
takes place in wc at t and e is an event of Gianni saying (something) such that, 
for any world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such 
that t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and there is an open eventuality e’ such that e’ takes place 
in w’ at t’ and e’ is an event of Maria writing a book
Schematic representation: TU ＜ TME & TME ⊆ TEE & TU ⊆ TEE
Second reading of (1)
For some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e such that e 
takes place in wc at t and e is an event of Gianni saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such that t ⊆ t’ 
and there is an open eventuality e’ such that e’ takes place in w’ at t’ and e’ is 
an event of Maria writing a book
Schematic representation: TU ＜ TME & TME ⊆ TEE
To make my derivations more reader-friendly, let me give explicit formulations 
of the rules and principles of chapter 4 that will be relevant for the derivations. 
Some of my reformulations of these rules and principles will slightly differ from 
the formulations given in chapter 4. For the sake of simplicity, I will ignore the 
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assignment parameter and the reference-time parameter of the interpretation 
function ⟦ ⟧g, c, w, Rt, Pt, t.1
Interpretation rules
Let c be a context, w be a world of evaluation, Pt be a perspective time, and t be 
a time of evaluation.
Functional application (FA)
If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ such that β’s 
denotation is of type <σ, τ> and γ’s denotation is of type σ, 
then ⟦α⟧c, w, Pt, t = ⟦β⟧c, w, Pt, t (⟦γ⟧c, w, Pt, t)
Intensional functional application (IFA)
If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ such that β’s 
denotation is of type <s, σ> and γ’s denotation is of type σ, then 
⟦α⟧c, w, Pt, t = ⟦β⟧c, w, Pt, t (λ〈w’, t’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦γ⟧c, w’, Pt, t’)
Non-branching nodes (NN)
If α is a non-branching node and β is its daughter, 
then ⟦α⟧c, w, Pt, t = ⟦β⟧c, w, Pt, t
Lexical entries
⟦Gianni⟧c, w, Pt, t = Gianni
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1 The reference-time parameter does not play  a significant role in the account of embedded 
tenses of chapter 4. The default time-shifting principle for reference times must be a principle 
that turns the time of eventuality  introduced by an eventive clause into the new reference ti-
me. (Stative clauses normally do not  introduce new reference times.) A principle of this sort is 
required for interpreting non-discourse-initial sentences. The different English sentences that 
we discussed in chapter 4, however, can be thought of as discourse-initial. For this reason, the 
reference-time parameter is not essential for the analysis of such sentences, even though it 
must be central to a general account of temporal discourse.
⟦will⟧c, w, Pt, t = λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that Pt ＜ t’ 
and uc ＜ t’, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
⟦say⟧c, w, Pt, t = λp ∈ D<s, t> [λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ D . e is an event of x saying 
such that, for any world w’ compatible with the content 
of e, p (〈w’, t〉) = 1]]
⟦Maria⟧c, w, Pt, t = Maria
⟦write a book⟧c, w, Pt, t = λe ∈ Dl . [λx ∈ D . e is an event of x writing a book]
I assume that that and be are semantically vacuous and leave the interpretation 
function unchanged.
Interpretations of feature values
If α is a terminal node,
⟦α[+perfective] [+episodic]⟧c, w, Pt, t = λu ∈ D<l, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some bounded 
eventuality e such that e LOC 〈w, t〉, u (e) 
(x) = 1]
⟦α[−perfective] [+episodic]⟧c, w, Pt, t = λu ∈ D<l, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some open 
eventuality e such that e LOC 〈w, t〉, u (e) 
(x) = 1]
⟦α[−past] [−past i]⟧c, w, Pt, t = λv  ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that 
Pt ⊆ t’ and uc ⊆ t’, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
⟦α [−past]⟧c, w, Pt, t = λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t’ ∈ T such that 
Pt ⊆ t’, v (〈w, t’〉) (x) = 1]
Intuitively, ‘e LOC 〈w, t〉’ means that the eventuality e is located at the world/time 
coordinate 〈w, t〉. If e is a bounded eventuality (an eventuality with initial and 
final endpoints), e LOC 〈w, t〉 just in case e occurs in w during t and t is the 
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smallest time that includes the initial and final endpoints of e. If e is an open 
eventuality (an eventuality without endpoints), e LOC 〈w, t〉 just in case e occurs 
in w during t and some part of (the preparatory phase of) e holds at each moment 
of t. I will paraphrase the predicate ‘LOC’ by saying that e takes place in w at t.
Theoretical principles
The account of tenses proposed in chapter 4 relies on the following principles:
Principle 1
If α is the syntactic complement of a modal or an intensional verb, 
then ⟦α⟧c, w, Pt, t = ⟦α⟧c, w, t, t
(Modals and intensional verbs trigger perspective-time shifts)
Principle 2
If α is c-commanded by a modal and α carries the feature value [−past i] 
or the feature value [+past i], [−past i]/[+past i] can be optionally de-
leted
(Modals optionally trigger indexical-tense-feature deletion)
Given the syntactic assumptions of chapter 4, (LF 1) is the (default) LF of 
(1).(Here I will use bracket notation to specify LF-representations.)
(LF 1) [MP [NP Gianni] [M’ [M will] [AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V say] 
[CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP 
[Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]]]]]
By virtue of Principle 2, (LF 1) can be transformed into (LF 1’). 
(LF 1’) [MP [NP Gianni] [M’ [M will] [AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] 
[VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past]] [AuxP 
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[Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a 
book]]]]]]]]]]
My account of embedded tenses predicts that (LF 1) and (LF 1’) are the two 
possible LFs of (1). Suppose that (1) is uttered in a context c. Suppose also that 
no discourse occurs before the utterance of (1) and that there is no location time 
or reference time that is salient in c. I will assume that under these conditions an 
LF φ of (1) counts as true in c just in case ⟦ ⟧c, wc, uc, uc yields the truth-value 1 
when its syntactic input is φ.
Truth-condition derivations
Derivation of the first reading of (1)
[MP [NP Gianni] [M’ [M will] [AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V say] [CP [C that] 
[TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] 
[VP write a book]]]]]]]]]] IS TRUE IN c iff …
1. ⟦[MP [NP Gianni] [M’ [M will] [AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V say] 
[CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP 
[Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, uc, uc  = 1
2. ⟦[M’ [M will] [AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP 
Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] 
[VP write a book]]]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, uc, uc (⟦[NP Gianni]⟧c, wc, uc, uc) = 1
by FA
3. ⟦[M’ [M will] [AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP 
Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] 
[VP write a book]]]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, uc, uc (Gianni) = 1
by NN and the lexical entry of Gianni
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4. ⟦[M will]⟧c, wc, uc, uc (λ〈w’, t’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V 
say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP 
[Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]]]⟧c, w’, uc, t’) (Gianni) = 1
by IFA
5. [λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, v (〈wc, t〉) (x) = 1]] 
(λ〈w’, t’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP 
Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP 
write a book]]]]]]]]⟧c, w’, uc, t’) (Gianni) = 1
by NN and the lexical entry of will
6. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, ⟦[AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] 
[VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] 
[AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, uc, t (x) = 1] 
(Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
7. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, ⟦[AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] 
[VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] 
[AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, t, t (x) = 1] 
(Gianni) = 1
by Principle 1
8. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, ⟦[Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]]⟧c, wc, t, 
t (⟦[VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux 
be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, t, t) (x) = 
1] (Gianni) = 1
by FA
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9. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, [λu ∈ D<l, <e, t>> . [λx’ ∈ D . for 
some bounded eventuality e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉, u (e) (x’) = 1]] (⟦[VP 
[V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] 
[AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, t, t) (x) = 1] 
(Gianni) = 1
by the interpretation of [+perfective] [+episodic]
10. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and ⟦[VP [V say] [CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T 
pres[−past] [−past  i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a 
book]]]]]]]⟧c, wc, t, t (e) (x) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
11. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and ⟦[V say]⟧c, wc, t, t (λ〈w’, t’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[CP [C that] 
[TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past  i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] 
[+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]]⟧c, w’, t, t’) (e) (x) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by IFA
12. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and [λp ∈ D<s, t> [λe’ ∈ Dl . [λx’ ∈ D . e’ is an event 
of x’ saying such that, for any world w’’ compatible with the content of e’, 
p (〈w’’, t〉) = 1]]] (λ〈w’, t’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T 
pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a 
book]]]]]]⟧c, w’, t, t’) (e) (x) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by NN and the lexical entry of say
13. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, ⟦[CP [C that] [TP [NP Maria] [T’ 
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[T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write 
a book]]]]]]⟧c, w’, t, t = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
14. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any world 
w’ compatible with the content of e, ⟦[TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] 
[AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]]⟧c, w’, t, t  = 
1] (Gianni) = 1
by the semantic vacuity of that
15. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, ⟦[T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP 
[Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]⟧c, w’, t, t (⟦[NP 
Maria]⟧c, w’, t, t) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by FA
16. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, ⟦[T’ [T pres[−past] [−past i]] [AuxP [Aux 
be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]]⟧c, w’, t, t (Maria) = 
1] (Gianni) = 1
by NN and the lexical entry of Maria
17. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, ⟦[T pres[−past] [−past i]]⟧c, w’, t, t 
(λ〈w’’, t’’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a 
book]]]⟧c, w’’, t, t’’) (Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
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by IFA
18. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any world 
w’ compatible with the content of e, [λv  ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx’ ∈ D . for some t’ 
∈ T such that t ⊆ t’ and uc ⊆ t’, v (〈w’, t’〉) (x’) = 1]] (λ〈w’’, t’’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[AuxP 
[Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]⟧c, w’’, t, t’’) 
(Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by the interpretation of [−past] [−past i]
19. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality 
e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such that 
t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and ⟦[AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write 
a book]]]⟧c, w’, t, t’ (Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
20. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventual-
ity e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for 
any world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T 
such that t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and ⟦[AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a 
book]]⟧c, w’, t, t’ (Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by the semantic vacuity of be
21. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any world 
w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such that t ⊆ t’, uc 
⊆ t’, and ⟦[Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]]⟧c, w’, t, t’ (⟦[VP write a book]]⟧c, w’, t, t’) 
(Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by FA
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22. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality 
e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such that 
t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and [λu ∈ D<l, <e, t>> . [λx’ ∈ D . for some open eventuality 
e’ such that e’ LOC 〈w’, t’〉, u (e’) (x’) = 1]] (⟦[VP write a book]]⟧c, w’, t, t’) 
(Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by the interpretation of [−perfective] [+episodic]
23. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventual-
ity e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for 
any world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T 
such that t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and [λx’ ∈ D . for some open eventuality e’ 
such that e’ LOC 〈w’, t’〉, ⟦[VP write a book]]⟧c, w’, t, t’  (e’) (x’) = 1] 
(Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
24. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventual-
ity e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for 
any world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T 
such that t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and [λx’ ∈ D . for some open eventuality e’ 
such that e’ LOC 〈w’, t’〉, [λe’’ ∈ Dl . [λx’’ ∈ D . e’’ is an event of x’’ 
writing a book]] (e’) (x’) = 1] (Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by NN and the lexical entry of write a book
25. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventual-
ity e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for 
any world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T 
such that t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and [λx’ ∈ D . for some open eventuality e’ 
such that e’ LOC 〈w’, t’〉, e’ is an event of x’ writing a book] (Maria) = 
1] (Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
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26. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality 
e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such that 
t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and there is an open eventuality e’ such that e’ LOC 〈w’, t’〉 
and e’ is an event of Maria writing a book] (Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
27. For some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e such 
that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of Gianni saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such that 
t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and there is an open eventuality e’ such that e’ LOC 〈w’, t’〉 
and e’ is an event of Maria writing a book
by λ-notation
28. For some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e such 
that e takes place in wc at t and e is an event of Gianni saying such 
that, for any world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some 
t’ ∈ T such that t ⊆ t’, uc ⊆ t’, and there is an open eventuality e’ such 
that e’ takes place in w’ at t’ and e’ is an event of Maria writing a book
by the meaning of LOC
Derivation of the second reading of (1)
Since (LF 1’) only differs from (LF 1) in that pres[−past] is the head of T, we can 
obtain (1)’s second reading via a step-by-step derivation with twenty-eight steps 
analogous to the steps 1-28 of the previous derivation. I will only write down the 
steps of (1)’s-second-reading derivation in which the truth-conditional difference 
between the two readings of (1) is generated. The other derivation steps simply 
differ from 1-28 in that pres[−past] [−past i] is substituted for pres[−past] and the condi-
tion that t ⊆ t’ and uc ⊆ t’ is substituted for the weaker condition that t ⊆ t’.
[MP [NP Gianni] [M’ [M will] [AspP [Asp ∅[+perfective] [+episodic]] [VP [V say] [CP [C that] 
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[TP [NP Maria] [T’ [T pres[−past]] [AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP 
write a book]]]]]]]]]] IS TRUE IN c iff …
17’. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality 
e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, ⟦[T pres[−past]]⟧c, w’, t, t (λ〈w’’, 
t’’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a 
book]]]⟧c, w’’, t, t’’) (Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
18’. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e 
such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, [λv ∈ D<s, <e, t>> . [λx’ ∈ D . for 
some t’ ∈ T such that t ⊆ t’, v (〈w’, t’〉) (x’) = 1]] (λ〈w’’, t’’〉 ∈ Ds . ⟦[AuxP 
[Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a book]]]⟧c, w’’, t, t’’) 
(Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by the interpretation of [−past]
19’. [λx ∈ D . for some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality 
e such that e LOC 〈wc, t〉 and e is an event of x saying such that, for any 
world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such that 
t ⊆ t’ and ⟦[AuxP [Aux be] [AspP [Asp -ing[−perfective] [+episodic]] [VP write a 
book]]]⟧c, w’, t, t’ (Maria) = 1] (Gianni) = 1
by λ-notation
…
28’. For some t ∈ T such that uc ＜ t, there is a bounded eventuality e such that 
e takes place in wc at t and e is an event of Gianni saying such that, for 
any world w’ compatible with the content of e, there is some t’ ∈ T such 
that t ⊆ t’ and there is an open eventuality e’ such that e’ takes place in w’ 
at t’ and e’ is an event of Maria writing a book
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Conclusions
In the first part of this dissertation I examined the literature on multiple temporal 
indexing with a critical eye. The general conclusion that emerges from Part 1 is 
that the case against multiply indexed temporal operators is weaker than what 
the critics of intensional approaches have generally supposed.
In chapter 1 I considered various expressibility arguments for double indexing 
and triple indexing. I analyzed the basic structure of expressibility arguments by 
looking at the arguments that Kamp and Vlach gave to motivate their respective 
double-index systems. I criticized van Benthem and Cresswell’s suggestion that 
the case for double indexing generalizes and leads to infinite temporal indexing. 
I argued that if we want to represent tenses and indexical time adverbs in terms 
of intensional operators, we do not need to multiply the number of time indices 
in order account for the sentences that van Benthem and Cresswell discuss.
In chapter 2 I criticized King’s suggestion that operator-based formalizations 
of English sentences are ad hoc and less elegant than standard quantificational 
formalizations. King considers English sentences similar to the ones that were 
discussed in chapter 1. I criticized King’s contention that an intensional theorists 
needs to posit ad hoc and inelegant operators in formalizing these sentence. With 
the aid of operators of the four categories that I distinguished in the chapter, it is 
possible to provide representations of those sentences which do not have the 
problematic features of the particular operator-based formalizations which King 
considers in his discussion.
In the second part of the dissertation I examined two linguistic phenomena 
that are prima facie problematic for intensional theories of tense: the pronominal 
uses of tenses and the behavior of embedded tenses.
Chapter 3 was devoted to examining the the so-called deictic, anaphoric and 
bound uses of tenses and modals. I discussed the suggestion that tenses, modals, 
and pronouns behave in parallel ways. This parallelism has been an important 
motivation for the development of variable-based accounts of tense and modal-
ity. I proposed an alternative analysis of the classical examples that illustrate the 
parallelism. According this analysis, tenses and modals are context-sensitive in-
tensional operators that act on a class of sub-sentential syntactic constituents that 
I called radicals. Since radicals are sub-sentential elements, tenses and modals 
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are sub-sentential operators according the analysis given in chapter 3. I argued 
that this analysis makes the right predictions about the classical examples of 
Partee and Stone. Although the analysis of chapter 3 treats personal pronouns as 
referential expressions, it analyzes tenses and modals as non-referential devices.
In chapter 4 I proposed a more sophisticated account of tenses. The account of 
embedded tenses proposed in chapter 4 was based on the idea that tenses specify 
a relation between a perspective time and a time of eventuality. By default, the 
perspective time is simply the time of utterance. But perspective-time shifts are 
triggered by intensional verbs and modals.
I presented an intensional semantic framework that allowed me to formalize 
these ideas. I also adopted certain syntactic assumptions that made my account 
of tenses compatible with modern syntactic theories. I argued that my account 
explains the shifted interpretations of the embedded English past in complement 
clauses and relative clauses. I also argued that it is better equipped to account for 
these interpretations than absolute and relative theories. I briefly discussed the 
simultaneous readings of past in past-under-past environments and suggested 
that my account of tenses is compatible with an explanation of the simultaneous 
readings in terms of a sequence-of-tense rule.
The intensional account proposed in chapter 4 vindicates the view that tenses 
are intensional grammatical devices. I hope that this account can be a promising 
point of departure for future research.
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